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JURY NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS AS 
STRUCTURAL ERROR 
Susan Yorke* 
Abstract: Jury nullification is a legal problem child. Aberrant but built into the 
Constitution, rebellious but merciful, lawless but often just, it defies easy categorization. 
Courts have been reluctant to discuss this unruly character, preferring that it remain in the 
shadows. When federal and state laws diverge, however, the problem of nullification rears its 
head, sometimes prompting courts to undertake the delicate task of talking about the 
unmentionable. This Article examines what courts can say about nullification and what 
should happen on appeal if they say too much. 
It is a basic tenet of criminal procedure that a trial court cannot direct a guilty verdict or 
p ni h j ror  for failing o re rn one, regardle  of he reng h of he pro ec ion  ca e. Ye  
when trial courts threaten juries with such improper punishment or suggest that juries lack the 
power to acquit, appellate courts have been loath to reverse the resulting convictions. Although 
some courts have acknowledged that such coercive anti-nullification instructions amount to 
constitutional error, they have subjected those errors to harmless error review. In doing so, 
courts have tended to downplay the significance of the error and focus on the strength of the 
pro ec ion  ca e, re l ing in circ lar rea oning ha  render  el i e an  remed  for he 
violation. 
But coercive anti-nullification instructional error is uniquely ill-suited to harmless error 
anal i . U ing he S preme Co r  recen  clarifica ion of he r c ral error doc rine in 
Weaver v. Massachusetts and building upon the emerging scholarly recognition of the jury-
trial right as primarily institutional, this Article argues that coercive anti-nullification 
in r c ion  a i f  all hree of he S preme Co r  ra ionale  for r c ral error. Fir , he 
jury-trial right implicated by the error protects institutional and community interests rather than 
he defendan  in ere  in a oiding erroneous conviction. Second, the unique nature of 
nullification means that the error defies traditional approaches to measuring its effect on the 
verdict. And third, because the error does violence to some of the central purposes of trial by 
jury, it always results in fundamental unfairness. Error resulting from coercive anti-
nullification instructions is therefore structural and should result in automatic reversal. 
  
                                                     
* Teaching Fellow, Ninth Circuit Practicum, University of California, Berkeley School of Law. J.D., 
Columbia Law School; M.P.A., Princeton University; B.A., Williams College. Many thanks to Laura 
Appleman, Jenny Carroll, Jason Iuliano, Justin McCrary, Gillian Metzger, and Michael Yu, among 
others, for their thoughtful input.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Picture this: The federal government charges a defendant with 
distributing marijuana. The evidence of guilt is seemingly irrefutable
there are numerous witnesses and a paper trail that runs for miles. Seems 
like a surefire conviction, right? But now add a wrinkle. The state in which 
the defendant lives and operates and from which the jury will be 
drawn has legalized marijuana, and the defendant has at least arguably 
been operating in compliance with state law.1 
If this wrinkle gives you pause as to whether the federal government 
will obtain a conviction, the reason is probably jury nullification. A jury 
from a state that, by the will of its people, has chosen to legalize marijuana 
might be more likely to return an acquittal. And it might do so despite 
                                                     
1. This is not just a hypothetical it happened in two recent Ninth Circuit cases. See United States 
v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1066 69 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1025
27 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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irrefutable evidence that the defendant has violated federal law as 
explained to the jury by the judge. In other words, the jury might well 
simply disregard the law because it does not agree with it. 
A jury indisputably has the power to nullify that is, the power to 
di regard he j dge  in r c ion  on he la  and re rn an acq i al 
despite clear evidence of guilt.2 But the case law is clear that a criminal 
defendant has no right to have a jury instructed on that power.3 Moreover, 
juries can be admonished that they must follow the law, and such 
admonishments can be strong ones up to a point.4 
It is clear that a judge cannot punish a jury for returning an acquittal 
that belies the law and evidence, nor can the court direct a verdict of 
guilty.5 And, at least in some jurisdictions, a judge cannot instruct jurors 
that they lack the power to nullify or imply that they might be penalized 
for doing so.6 Although the rule that judges cannot mislead juries or 
threaten them with punishment if they are perceived to have disregarded 
the law would appear to be a sensible one, it has proved to be rather 
toothless, even in the courts in which it is recognized.7 
That toothlessness derives in large part from the fact that courts have 
concluded that misinforming or threatening a jury about its power to 
acquit does not amount to structural error.8 Instead, courts have subjected 
such errors to harmless error analysis an analysis that is intrinsically 
problematic when one concedes, as one generally must in this context, 
that the evidence presented was strong enough (indeed, often 
overwhelmingly so) to sustain a conviction.9 
The structural error doctrine is of relatively recent vintage, and its 
precise contours have been difficult to define.10 In its 2017 decision in 
                                                     
2. THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200 1800, at xiii (1985); see also infra section I.A. 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 06 (11 h Cir. 1983) ( [C]o r  . . . have 
almost uniformly held that a criminal defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction which points up 
the existence of [jury nullifica ion]. ); see also infra section I.B. 
4. See Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thomas, 116 
F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997). 
5. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615; Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986). 
6. See Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1032; State v. Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d 485, 507 (Kan. 2014). 
7. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting); 
Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1032. 
8. See Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1033 34; Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 507. 
9. Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1031 36; Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 490 92; see also infra Part III. 
10. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the 
Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2038 39 (2008); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless 
Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 82 83 (1988); see also infra Part II.  
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Weaver v. Massachusetts,11 however, the Supreme Court clarified the 
rationales for classifying certain errors as structural, identifying three 
categories of structural error.12 First, an error may be structural if the right 
at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous 
conviction.13 Second, an error may be structural if its effects are simply 
too hard to measure.14 And third, an error may be structural if it always 
results in fundamental unfairness.15 
This Article argues that improperly coercive anti-nullification 
instructions qualify as structural error under all three categories. First, the 
right at issue trial by jury is primarily an institutional safeguard built 
to protect the people from tyrannical government and to serve as a check 
on unjust lawmaking and enforcement, rather than an attempt to avoid 
erroneous conviction. Second, the effects of the error are uniquely 
diffic l  o mea re. The reng h of he pro ec ion  ca e and he 
correctness of the other instructions the jury received standard fare for 
measuring the effect of an error on the verdict reveal little or nothing 
about the actual effect of any error in this context. And third, the error 
always results in fundamental unfairness in that a defendant who is 
convicted by a jury that has been affirmatively misled about the scope of 
its own power or fears government reprisal cannot be said to have received 
a fair trial. Such errors do violence to the institution itself in ways that are 
fundamentally unfair to the public as a whole. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief description of 
jury nullification and a summary of the current state of the law related to 
instructions about nullification. Part II discusses the evolution of 
constitutional harmless error analysis and its counterpart, structural error, 
c lmina ing in he S preme Co r  deci ion in Weaver. Part III argues 
that coercive anti-nullification instructions satisfy not just one, but all 
three, of Weaver s categories of structural error. Finally, Part IV considers 
some of the potential analytical and public policy objections to classifying 
coercive anti-nullification instructions as structural error. 
                                                     
11. __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017). 
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I. A CRASH COURSE ON THE BASICS OF JURY 
NULLIFICATION 
A. What We Talk About When We Talk About Nullification 
The erm j r  n llifica ion,  a  i  mo  ba ic, in ol e  a j r  
rejection of the governing law in order to return an acquittal in a criminal 
case.16 Despite clear evidence that the defendant committed the alleged 
act and clear instructions that the alleged act constitutes a crime, the jury 
nonetheless refuses to convict.17 
A j r  deci ion o n llif  can ari e o  of e eral differen  
con idera ion . In i  p re  form, j r  n llifica ion occ r  hen he j r  
recognizes that a defendan  ac  i  pro cribed b  he la  b  acq i  
beca e i  doe  no  belie e he ac  ho ld be pro cribed. 18 For example, 
in mid-nineteenth century Utah, juries often refused to indict or convict 
defendants for the newly-established federal crime of polygamy a 
practice that religious leader Brigham Young had endorsed only a decade 
earlier.19 Many Mormon jurors believed that the law proscribing 
polygamy was both unconstitutional and morally wrong.20 In accordance 
with those beliefs and in contravention of the applicable law and 
evidence presented they either refused to indict or delivered acquittals.21 
A more modern example would be the one from the introduction: a jury 
in a state that has legalized marijuana acquits a defendant of federal drug 
crimes despite clear evidence that he has distributed marijuana in 
contravention of federal law.22 Bo h of he e e ample  con i e cla ic  
or core  n llifica ion.23 
An intermediate form of nullification occurs when the jury believes that 
                                                     
16. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 
(1997).  
17. GREEN, supra note 2, at xiii. 
18. Id. at xviii.  
19. Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1133, 1188 89 (2011).  
20. Id. a  1190 ( Mormon  con idered he h mani arian claim [again  pol gam ] ab rd. To hem, 
polygamy was not only ordained by God by also endorsed by women. . . . Instead of humanitarianism, 
Mormons thought the central issues were constitutional questions, chiefly concerning federalism but 
also concerning freedom of religion. They insisted that they had the constitutional right to structure 
heir dome ic rela ion  like marriage ho e er he U ah majori  a  fi . ). 
21. Id. at 1189.  
22. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting) 
(e plaining ha , in a federal pro ec ion for marij ana di rib ion, nullification was an obvious 
po ibili  gi en he pop lari  of medical marij ana in California ).  
23. See Bressler, supra note 19, at 1189. 
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the act at issue should indeed be criminalized but disagrees with the 
prescribed punishment.24 In other words, when a jury considers the 
punishment for a particular act to be excessive, it may refuse to convict at 
all in order to prevent the imposition of that punishment.25 This type of 
nullification may arise in the context of crimes that carry with them widely 
known and severe mandatory minimum sentences, such as some drug 
crimes or firearm enhancements.26 A historical example is the tendency of 
juries to acquit defendants of capital offenses when those crimes were 
subject to a mandatory death penalty.27 
Finally, in its most attenuated form, nullification can occur when a jury 
agrees both that the act at issue should be criminal and that it should 
generally be punished as prescribed, but the jury opposes punishment 
under the particular circumstances presented.28 This type of ad hoc 
nullification can spring from a variety of motivations sympathy for a 
particular defendant, a desire for leniency for acts committed under dire 
circumstances, fear of repri al from a defendan  famil  or poli ical 
connections, or prejudice against the victim.29 Defendants who steal to 
feed their families or euthanize suffering family members at their request 
might well be candidates for merciful acquittal under this type of 
nullification.30 More problematic examples abound, including the refusal 
of all-white juries to indict or convict white defendants accused of 
assaulting or murdering people of color.31 
What all forms of jury nullification have in common is a refusal simply 
                                                     
24. GREEN, supra note 2, at xviii. 
25. Id. 
26. See, e.g., Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come 
(Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1782 83 (1999) (di c ing he endenc  of j ror  o n llif  in he 
face of widely-kno n de ermina e en encing a e ). J rie  picall  are not instructed on the 
punishments that might result from particular convictions. See Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant 
After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
2223, 2237 (2010).  
27. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 & n.29 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 297 98 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971); see also George Fisher, The 
Jury s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 602 & n.83 (1997) (pro iding e ample  of j rie  
hi orical endenc  o emper he la  e eri , e en in he face of clear e idence of g il ).  
28. GREEN, supra note 2, at xviii. 
29. Id. at xviii xx.  
30. See Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullification, 
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 169, 170 n.19 (1991); Brown, supra note 16, at 1183 84, 1189 91. 
31. See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 138 (1998); 
Bressler, supra note 19, at 1183 84. For a discussion of the ways in which communities might 
leverage jury nullification to challenge racial bias in the criminal justice system, see Paul Butler, 
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 
(1995).  
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to apply the law to the facts of the case and accept the verdict that reveals 
itself through that process.32 Nullification indicates that something in the 
system is unbalanced. The law itself is out of step with the community, a 
pro ec or  di cre ionar  deci ion o charge a par ic lar defendan  failed 
to account for the sympathetic circumstances of the case, or prejudice has 
rendered justice unavailable to a particular class of victims. Particularly 
in its core form, nullification is a proverbial canary in the judicial coal 
mine, a symptom of profound misalignment between lawmakers and 
the community. 
Much has been said and little agreement has been reached about 
whether nullification is good  or bad,  and he an er of en depend  on 
the context.33 To man , n llifica ion in ol e  an abdica ion of he j r  
traditional role.34 By disregarding the law to act in accordance with 
conscience, the jury usurps the powers of the legislature and of the 
judiciary, claiming for itself momentary power over the law.35 Because 
nullification subverts what some see as wholly separate roles the 
legislature determines the law, the judge instructs on the law, and the jury 
finds the facts nullification is often described as lawless or 
anarchic behavior.36 
Viewed differently, however, nullification is an essential part of the 
jury trial right.37 As discussed in greater detail below, a significant aspect 
of o r na ion  a achmen  o j r  rial  i  he idea ha  j ries act as the 
oice of he comm ni ,  e en (or perhap  e peciall ) hen comm ni  
mores differ from the applicable laws.38 That particular role has little or 
                                                     
32. Brown, supra note 16, at 1151 & n.8.  
33. See id. at 1149 53 (describing the long-running debate and collecting scholarship); Jenny E. 
Carroll, The Jury s Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2012).  
34. Brown, supra note 16, at 1150 52; Carroll, supra note 33, at 659. 
35. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 71 (1895). The jury once had the explicit right to decide 
questions of law, but that power was eroded over a series of decisions during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Brown, supra note 16, at 1160; Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right 
to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 174 77 (1972); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal 
Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Carroll, supra note 33, at 659. 
36. Brown, supra note 16, at 1151 n.7; see also United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 20 
(9th Cir. 1972) (quoting statement from Justice Fortas and Judge Rifkind describing jury nullification 
a  an a ack pon he la  and ha  i  o ld lead o a ocie  i ho  la ); Uni ed S a e  . 
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (de cribing n llifica ion a  he happening of 
he la le  j r ); People . Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726 n.39 (Cal. 1983) (no ing that nullification is 
akin to anarchy). 
37. See Fisher, supra note 27, at 581 82 ( [N]o  only do juries manifestly make law witness the 
repeated refusals of Michigan juries to convict Jack Kevorkian of assisting suicide but many 
ob er er  regard heir po er o do o a  a f ndamen al par  of o r rial em. ). 
38. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059; see also infra Part III. 
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nothing to do with objective factfinding and faithful application of the law 
and everything to do with acting as a moral check on government 
authority.39 Juries exercise that unique function through their power to 
nullify, which is built into the Constitution through the operation of the 
jury-trial right, the venue clause, and the prohibition on double jeopardy.40 
The jury trial right combined i h he en e cla e  manda e ha  he 
j r  be dra n from he defendan  locale ensures community 
participation.41 And the Double Jeopardy Clause insulates the 
comm ni  e erci e of lenienc  b  prohibi ing retrial or appeal by the 
government following an acquittal, in essence creating space for 
nullification to occur and shielding it from judicial review.42 Accordingly, 
many scholars view nullification not as errant but as the exercise of a 
constitutionally protected power that is an essential part of our system 
of governance.43 
Nullification thus simultaneously occupies dissonant roles in our 
jurisprudential universe.44 It is anarchy, subverting the most basic tenets 
of our adjudicative process. And it is itself a fundamental tenet of that 
process, instilling in the people the power to resist government tyranny 
                                                     
39. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569
70 (1977).  
40. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2053; see also Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569 70 
(indicating the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect the citizen from the sovereign); 
Uni ed S a e  . Thoma , 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997) ( [T]he er  in i ion of rial b  j r  in 
a criminal ca e, a  J dge Learned Hand ob er ed, in rod ce  a lack in o he enforcement of law, 
empering i  rigor b  he mollif ing infl ence of c rren  e hical con en ion .  . . . [S]everal features 
of o r j r  rial em ac  o pro ec  he j r  po er o acq i , regardle  of he e idence, hen he 
pro ec ion  ca e mee  i h he j r  moral[] di appro [al]. ).  
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ( The Trial of all Crime , e cep  in Ca e  of Impeachmen , hall 
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed . . . . ); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ( In all criminal pro ec ion , he acc ed hall enjo  he 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed . . . . ); see also Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615 (discussing the unique features of the 
jury trial system); LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 13 38 (2015) (discussing the evolution of the jury trial system).  
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ( [N]or hall an  per on be bjec  for he ame offen e o be ice 
p  in jeopard  of life or limb. ); see also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) 
(explaining that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes a general bar on government appeals following 
an acquittal by jury). 
43. See Scheflin, supra note 35, at 170; see also United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 n.11 
(9 h Cir. 1972) (no ing ha  he acq i al  of William Penn and John Pe er Zenger ill ra e ho  ell 
o r ocie  in ere  ha e been er ed b  acq i al  re l ing from applica ion b  he j ror  of heir 
collective con cience and en e of j ice ).   
44. See Stacey P. Eilbaum, Note, The Dual Face of the American Jury: The Antiauthoritarian and 
Antimajoritarian Hero and Villain in American Law and Legal Scholarship, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
711, 721 (2013) ( The S preme Co r  and lo er federal co r  no  onl  hail he j r  a  a ba ion of 
liber , he  al o deride i  a  a eed of anarch . ). 
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and prevent injustice. Law values order; nullification is mayhem. But it is 
mayhem that was purposefully built into the system. Needless to say, this 
duality makes talking about nullification a bit dicey, particularly for 
the courts. 
B. What Trial Courts Can Talk About When They Talk About 
Nullification 
The benefits and dangers of nullification are real. To a defendant facing 
a long sentence for committing an act whose criminality is unpopular, 
nullification may be a lone ray of hope. To a judge concerned with 
preserving the integrity of the legal system, nullification may appear to 
pose an existential threat to both the legislative and adjudicative 
processes.45 To a community, nullification can vindicate its highest values 
or reflect its deepest prejudices. And when nullification does occur, it can 
be difficult to identify with certainty and, in any event, is unreviewable by 
any appellate court.46 
The chimerical nature of nullification makes it difficult to pin down, 
and its unusual status in our constitutional framework renders it elusive. 
It should, therefore, come as no great surprise that much of the 
jurisprudence concerning nullification has been less about the thing itself 
than about what can or cannot be said about it. 
1. The Power That Dare Not Speak Its Name 
The debate about whether jurors should be affirmatively instructed 
about their power to nullify, although largely settled in the courts, remains 
contentious among activists, academics, and even some federal judges.47 
                                                     
45. See, e.g., Sparf v. United S a e , 156 U.S. 51, 71 (1895) ( If a pe i  j r  can righ f ll  e erci e 
this power over one statute of [C]ongress, they must have an equal right and power over any other 
statute, and indeed over all the statutes; for no line can be drawn, no restriction imposed, on the 
exercise of such power; it must rest in discretion only. If this power be once admitted, petit jurors will 
be perior o he na ional legi la re, and i  la  ill be bjec  o heir con rol.  (q o ing Uni ed 
States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709))); see also id. a  101 ( P blic 
and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases 
may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto 
hem el e . ).  
46. Because jurors have in irrefutable right to decide the facts of the case, it is often difficult to say 
with absolute clarity that an acquittal resulted from nullification rather than reasonable doubt about 
some element of the crime. See id. a  91 ( hen a j r  i e  a general erdic  of acq i al, i  co ld 
never be proved, where the case went to the jury upon both law and facts, that the jurors did not 
proceed pon heir ie  of he e idence ); Bro n, supra note 16, at 1152 n.8.  
47. Indeed, a grassroots movement to inform potential jurors of their power to nullify has been 
ongoing for some time. See About FIJA, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASS N, https://fija.org/about-
fija/overview.html [https://perma.cc/8E3D-EZKS]; see also Celeste Headlee, Jury Nullification: 
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Because this Article is concerned primarily with the issue of anti-
nullification instructions and, in particular, with how to classify errors 
arising from them it will touch on the question of affirmative 
nullification instructions only briefly. The main takeaway is that, at the 
present moment, instructions that affirmatively inform the jury of its 
power to nullify are certainly not required and are distinctly disfavored.48 
This result was by no means a foregone conclusion. Until the end of 
the nineteenth century, courts and lawmakers vigorously debated whether 
the jury had the right to decide not only questions of fact but also questions 
of law.49 In many colonies, the practice around the time of the founding 
a  ha  j rie  decided bo h la  and fac , hile he rial j dge  role a  
merel  o pre er e order. 50 After the adoption of the Constitution, juries 
continued to play an active role as arbiters of both law and fact.51 Judges 
often instructed juries about their independence to determine for 
themselves the ultimate questions presented by the case.52 During this 
period, he concep  of he j r  a  one of he people  mo  e en ial 
vanguards against political oppression continued as an underlying 
                                                     
Acquitting Based on Principle, NAT L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=242990498 [https://perma.cc/WP2H-222K]. 
Academic debate also continues, including a resurgence of originalist arguments that nullification 
should be viewed as an integral part of the jury trial right. See Bressler, supra note 19, at 1135; see 
also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 30, at 165 66 (collecting academic perspectives on both sides 
of the debate); Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional 
Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563 (1997) (collecting academic 
arguments in favor of affirmative instruction on nullification). Even some federal judges have joined 
the fray, providing or advocating for affirmative instructions on nullification. Bressler, supra note 19, 
at 1140 41. And some states have made efforts to pass legislation requiring jurors to be instructed on 
their power to nullify. See S.B. 924, 79th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017); H.B. 133, 2017 Sess. 
(N.H. 2017); H.B. 332, 2017 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).  
48. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133 37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ( Thi  o-called 
right of jury nullification is put forward in the name of liberty and democracy, but its explicit avowal 
risks the ultimate logic of anarchy. . . . This requirement of independent jury conception confines the 
happening of the lawless jury to the occasional instance that does not violate, and viewed as an 
exception may even enhance, the over-all normative effect of the rule of law. An explicit instruction 
to a jury conveys an implied approval that runs the risk of degrading the legal structure requisite for 
r e freedom, for an ordered liber  ha  pro ec  again  anarch  a  ell a  rann . ); People . 
Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726 n.39 (Cal. 1983) (affirma i e in r c ion  on j r  n llifica ion ma  achie e 
pragmatic justice in i ola ed in ance , b  e gge  he more likel  re l  i  anarch ); see also 
United States v. González-Pérez, 778 F.3d 3, 18 19 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Trujillo, 714 
F.2d 102, 105 06 (11th Cir. 1983). 
49. See Howe, supra note 35, at 590 96. 
50. Id. at 591.  
51. Scheflin, supra note 35, at 175 76. 
52. Id. 
 
Yorke (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:54 PM 
2020] JURY NULLIFICATION AND STRUCTURAL ERROR 1451 
 
principle in he American j dicial em. 53 But the tide began to shift in 
the mid-1800 , c lmina ing in he S preme Co r  1895 decision in Sparf 
v. United States.54 Sparf put an end to the period of complete jury 
independence. There the Court held that a defendant has no right to have 
the jury instructed on a lesser offense where the evidence would not 
rationally support a conviction for the lesser, but not the greater, offense.55 
In so holding, the Court observed that, while the jury has the right to 
decide the facts, it has no such right to decide the law.56 Ra her, [i]  i  he 
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law, and it is the duty of the 
jury to follow the la  a  i  i  laid do n b  he co r . 57 
In Sparf, the Court focused on the threat posed to society and, in 
particular, to criminal defendants if juries were allowed to decide for 
themselves what the law was.58 What, the Court wondered, would become 
of us if juries could convict defendants based on their own irrational, 
uninformed, or biased view of the law?59 Nothing good, the Court 
ultimately concluded, so it must be that juries have no right to decide 
questions of law.60 
De pi e he Co r  foc  on he risks to criminal defendants if juries 
were allowed to decide questions of law, Sparf itself involved the denial 
of a defendan  req e  for an in r c ion on le er crime .61 In holding 
that the defendant had no right to such an instruction, the Court had to turn 
its proposition that defendants have the right to be convicted only of 
crimes controlled b  e led, fi ed, legal principle on its head, 
extrapolating that defendants concomitantly have no right to be acquitted 
in contravention of those principles.62 In other words, because a jury has 
no right to convict based on its own view of the law, it also lacks any right 
to acquit on a more serious offense while convicting of a lesser offense 
where the evidence supports no such distinction.63 The Court reasoned 
                                                     
53. Id. at 175. 
54. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).  
55. Id. at 106. 
56. Id. at 71 74 (citations omitted).  
57. Id. at 74 (quoting United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) 
(No. 14,545)). 
58. See id. (quoting Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043).  
59. Id. at 71, 74 (quoting United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) 
(No. 14,709)). 
60. Id. at 74, 101; see also Brown, supra note 16, at 1150 (e plaining ha  j r  n llifica ion i  
di fa ored in large par  beca e i  eem  o ndermine he r le of la ).  
61. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 59, 99. 
62. Id. at 101 03.  
63. Id. 
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that a jury who chose to convict for one of those lesser crimes rather than 
the greater one where no evidence supported the distinction would 
necessarily be disregarding the law.64 Because the jury had no right to do 
so, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on lesser 
included offenses.65 
The majority in Sparf did ackno ledge he j r  inheren  po er o 
acquit in the teeth of the law.66 But it seemed to view that power as a 
dangerous anomaly rather than as an integral part of the adjudicative 
system.67 That view drew a strong dissent, which focused on the idea that 
the jury trial right exists in large part to protect defendants from autocratic 
governments, which might impose unjust laws.68 The dissent explained 
that the existence of jury trials allo  he people o ake par  in e er  
conviction of a person accused of crime by the government; and the 
general knowledge that no man can be otherwise convicted increases 
public confidence in the justice of convictions, and is a strong bulwark of 
the admini ra ion of he criminal la . 69 The dissent argued that this 
in ere  ga e he j r  he ndo b ed and ncon rollable po er o 
determine for themselves the law as well as the fact by a general verdict 
of acq i al. 70 
Sparf and its progeny established, among other things, that although a 
jury has the power to nullify, there is no freestanding nullification right.71 
Consistent with that understanding, a defendant has no right to an 
                                                     
64. Id. at 99 100. 
65. Id. at 103. Later decisions have recognized that allowing a jury to convict on lesser included 
offen e  can be beneficial o he defendan  beca e i  afford  he j r  a le  dra ic al erna i e han 
he choice be een con ic ion of he offen e charged and acq i al.  Beck . Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 
633 (1980). That latitude encourages the jury to strictly apply the reasonable doubt standard, and the 
Supreme Court has rejected the idea that prohibiting instruction on lesser included offenses where 
the evidence supports such an instruction will help prevent jury nullification. Id. at 640 41. Sparf 
survives in part because it applies only in cases where no evidence supports the contention that the 
defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense. See Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury 
Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 61 63 (1980) 
(discussing the limited nature of the actual holding in Sparf).  
66. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 84. 
67. Id. at 101 02. 
68. Id. at 110 83 (Gray, J., dissenting).  
69. Id. at 175. 
70. Id. at 174. 
71. See St. John, supra note 47, a  2563 ( Since he S preme Co r  1895 deci ion in Sparf v. 
United States, it has been a commonplace understanding that criminal juries have the power but not 
the right to nullify the law before them . . . . ); see also Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 
135, 138 (1920); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 37 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Merced v. 
McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005).  
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affirmative nullification instruction.72 Moreover, defense counsel has no 
right even to make a nullification-based argument to the jury.73 Thus, 
although debate over this issue and o er he correc ne  of he Co r  
decision in Sparf continues to rage, the present situation can be 
summarized succinctly: Juries have the power to nullify, but no one dare 
mention it.74 
2. Laying Down the Law About Following the Law 
If a court should not affirmatively instruct juries about their power to 
nullify, may it take affirmative action to dissuade them from doing so? 
And if so, how far may a court go o pre en  he mi chie o  
con eq ence 75 of nullification? 
The an er i  ha  co r  ha e he d  o fore all or pre en  
[n llifica ion], he her b  firm in r c ion or admoni ion. 76 In doing so, 
                                                     
72. See, e.g., Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1135 36 ( The a  he j r  opera e  ma  be radicall  al ered 
if there is alteration in the way it is told to operate. The jury knows well enough that its prerogative 
is not limited to the choices articulated in the formal instructions of the court. . . . What makes for 
health as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily diet. The fact that there is widespread 
e i ence of he j r  preroga i e, and appro al of i  e i ence a  a nece ar  co n er o ca e-
hardened judges and arbitrar  pro ec or ,  doe  no  e abli h a  an impera i e ha  he j r  m  be 
informed b  he j dge of ha  po er. ); Uni ed S a e  . Tr jillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 (11 h Cir. 1983) 
( The co r  ha  ha e con idered he q e ion ha e almo  niforml  held hat a criminal defendant 
is not entitled to a jury instruction which points up to the existence of that practical power [of 
n llifica ion]. ).  
73. See Sparf, 156 U.S. a  102 ( [W]here he ma er i  not controlled by express constitutional or 
statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as 
declared b  he co r . ); Uni ed S a e  . Kr ke, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6 h Cir. 1988) (no ing ha  
fe  co r  ha e e en permi ed arg men  o he j r  on he opic ). 
74. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130 37 (explaining that juries can glean from informal sources 
that they have the power to nullify, and that instructing them on that power would imperil the rule of 
law, unduly burden jurors, and upset the balance in which juries resort to nullification only as a safety 
valve in extraordinary cases); see also United States v. Davis, 724 F.3d 949, 954 55 (7th Cir. 2013) 
( Al ho gh j r  n llifica ion i  a na ral and a  ime  de irable aberra ion nder o r em, i  i  no  
to be positively sanctioned by instructions . . . .  (q o ing Uni ed S a e  . Ander on, 716 F.2d 466, 
449 50 (7th Cir. 1983))); United S a e  . Pere , 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7 h Cir. 1996) ( An nrea onable 
jury verdict, although unreviewable if it is an acquittal, is lawless, and the defendant has no right to 
in i e he j r  o ac  la le l . ); Uni ed S a e  . Sep l eda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) 
( Tho gh j r  n llifica ion ha  a long and ome ime  oried pa  . . . the case law makes plain that a 
j dge ma  no  in r c  he j r  anen  i  hi or , i ali , or e.  (ci a ion omi ed)); Trujillo, 714 
F.2d a  106 ( While e recognize that a jury may render a verdict at odds with the evidence or the 
la , nei her he co r  nor co n el ho ld enco rage j ror  o iola e heir oa h. ); S a e . S in on, 
No. 112,655, 2016 WL 3031216, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. May 27, 2016) (Atcheson, J., concurring) 
( One of he parado e  of j r  n llifica ion lie  in he ilence ha  hro d  i . ).   
75. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 71.  
76. Merced, 426 F.3d at 1079 80 (quoting Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980)); see 
also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997).  
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courts can go pretty far, but there is a limit. 
On one end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
judges can instruct the jury that it should follow the law as provided to it 
by the court.77 Indeed, such instructions are uniform in federal courts and 
many states.78 A co r  can al o ell he j r  ha  i  ho ld no  b i e 
i  en e of j ice for i  d  o follo  he la  or decide he her a la  
i  j  or nj . 79 Moreover, voir dire can include questions targeted at 
identifying and removing would-be nullifiers, and jurors can be made to 
take an oath affirming that they will follow the law.80 
Courts cannot, however, punish jurors for failing to return a verdict that 
the court believes is compelled by the evidence. That rule dates back to 
early England and the famous Bushell s Case.81 In Bushell s Case, 
Quakers William Penn and William Mead were charged with preaching 
o an nla f l a embl . 82 The jury refused to return a guilty verdict, 
despite the strength of the prosecution  ca e.83 The judge thought that the 
jury, in refusing to convict, was disregarding the law, and it punished them 
for that decision, declaring: 
Gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict that 
the court will accept; and you shall be locked up, without meat, 
drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall not think thus to abuse the 
court; we will have a verdict by the help of God, or you shall 
starve for it.84 
The jurors nonetheless returned an acquittal, whereupon the court fined 
                                                     
77. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995) ( [T]he j dge m  be permi ed o 
in r c  he j r  on he la  and o in i  ha  he j r  follo  hi  in r c ion . ); Horning v. District of 
Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920) (Brandei , J., di en ing) ( Since Sparf v. United States . . . it is 
settled that, even in criminal cases, it is the duty of the jury to apply the law given them by the 
pre iding j dge o he fac  hich he  find. ).  
78. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1105, 1140 44 (2014) (discussing the rise of formalized instructions that constrain the role of the 
jury); 9TH CIR. MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTR.  CRIM. 3.1 (2019) ( I  i  also your duty to apply 
he la  a  I gi e i  o o  o he fac  a  o  find hem, he her o  agree i h he la  or no . ); see 
also 1ST CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR.  CRIM. 3.01 (2019); 3D CIR. MODEL JURY INSTR.  CRIM. 3.01 
(2015); 5TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR.  CRIM. 1.04 (2019); 6TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR.  
CRIM. 1.02 (2019); 7TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR.  CRIM. 1.01 (2019); 8TH CIR. PATTERN JURY 
INSTR.  CRIM. 3.02 (2017); 10TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR.  CRIM. 1.04 (2018); 11TH CIR. 
PATTERN JURY INSTR.  CRIM. B2.2 (2016); JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. JURY INSTR.  CRIM. 200 (2020).  
79. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2017).  
80. See Bressler, supra note 19, at 1138 n.12; Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616 17.  
81. Bushell s Case (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006; see also Howe, supra note 35, at 583. 
82. Scheflin, supra note 35, at 168, 170.  
83. Id. 
84. Id. (quoting Penn & Meads  Case, 6 Howell s 951, 963 (1670)). 
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them and ordered them imprisoned until their fines were paid.85 They 
sought release from prison by petitioning for habeas corpus relief.86 On 
review of the writ, the reviewing court declared that the jury could not be 
punished or forced to deliver a conviction.87 That case has been viewed as 
establishing a general rule that jurors cannot be punished for acquitting 
in he ee h of bo h la  and fac . 88 
Courts similarly cannot direct the jury to issue a guilty verdict, no 
ma er ho  compelling he go ernmen  e idence ma  be.89 To do so 
deprives the defendant of the right to trial by jury, because the judge, not 
the jury, has adjudicated guilt.90 A directed verdict for the government 
e i cera e  he Si h Amendmen  j r  rial righ  b  depri ing he j r  
of the ultimate decision whether to acquit.91 
Between these extremes, there is some room for disagreement. But 
American j dge  ha e generall  a oided ch in erference a  o ld 
divest juries of their power to acquit an accused, even though the evidence 
of hi  g il  ma  be clear. 92 And the Supreme Court has made clear that a 
rial j dge i  hereb  barred from a emp ing o o erride or in erfere i h 
he j ror  independen  j dgmen  in a manner con rar  o he in ere  of 
                                                     
85. Id. at 171 (quoting Penn & Meads  Case, 6 Howell s at 967).  
86. Id. at 172.  
87. Id.; B hell  Ca e (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 ( If he meaning of he e ord , finding 
against the direction of the Court in matter of law, be, that if the Judge having heard the evidence 
given in Court (for he knows no other) shall tell the jury, upon this evidence, the law is for the plaintiff, 
or for the defendant, and you are under the pain of fine and imprisonment to find accordingly, then 
the jury ought of duty so to do; every man sees that the jury is but a troublesome delay, great charge, 
and of no use in determining right and wrong, and therefore the tryals [sic] by them may be better 
aboli h d han con in ed; hich ere a range ne -found conclusion, after a tryal [sic] so celebrated 
for many hundreds of years. For if the Judge, from the evidence, shall by his own judgment first 
resolve upon any tryal [sic] what the fact is, and so knowing the fact, shall then resolve what the law 
is, and order the jury penalty to find accordingly, what either necessary or convenient use can be 
fancied of j rie , or o con in e rial  b  hem a  all? ). 
88. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); see also United States v. Thomas, 
116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that since Bushell s Case, n llif ing j ror  ha e been 
pro ec ed from being called o acco n  for heir erdic ).  
89. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 
430 U.S. 564, 572 73 (1977)); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952) 
( [J] rie  are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges. . . . They might have refused to 
brand Mori e e a  a hief. Had he  done o, ha  oo o ld ha e been he end of he ma er. ).  
90. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.  
91. Id.; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. 
United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947). 
92. United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 520 (1972); see also United States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 
439, 442 (6 h Cir. 1980) ( In he e erci e of i  f nc ion  no  onl  m  he j r  be free from direc  
control in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure, both contemporaneous and 
b eq en .  (q o ing Uni ed S a e  . Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180 81 (1st Cir. 1969))).  
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he acc ed. 93 
Applied to the question of jury instructions about nullification, the 
uneasy consensus, at least in the Ninth Circuit and some states, is that a 
court may strongly admonish jurors to follow the law but cannot 
affirmatively misstate their power or threaten them with punishment.94 
Accordingl , a co r  hould not state or imply (1) that jurors could be 
punished for nullification, or that (2) an acquittal resulting from 
n llifica ion i  in alid. 95 The problem with such instructions is that they 
deprive juries of their ability to freely choose whether to acquit and, in 
doing so, begin to resemble a directed verdict, which plainly violates the 
Sixth Amendment.96 
Just what constitutes impermissible coercion is a difficult question, as 
several recent cases elucidate. For example, in United States v. 
Kleinman,97 the district court was faced with circumstances that raised 
concern about nullification.98 The defendant, who ran a medical marijuana 
dispensary in California that at least arguably complied with state law, 
had been charged with federal drug crimes.99 In trying to encourage jurors 
to faithfully apply the federal law which would, under the essentially 
undisputed facts, require conviction the court instructed the jurors that 
he  o ld iola e heir oa h and he la  if he  illf ll  bro gh  a 
                                                     
93. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 573. 
94. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1079 (9th Cir. 2018); State v. Smith-Parker, 340 
P.3d 485, 506 (Kan. 2014). 
95. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2017). But see United States v. 
Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding, over a strong dissent, that the district court 
did no  err in in r c ing he j r  ha  here i  no ch hing a  alid j r  n llifica ion  and ha  j ror  
o ld iola e [ heir] oa h and the law if [they] willfully brought in a verdict contrary to the law given 
o  in hi  ca e ). The Second Circ i  ha  gge ed ha  i  o ld be improper for he di ric  co r  
to provide an instruction that (incorrectly) asserts that an inconsistent verdict on multiple counts 
would be invalid. See United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 422 23 (2d Cir. 1967) ( [A]llo ing 
inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials runs the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the 
result of compromise. But the advantage of leaving the jury free to exercise its historic power of lenity 
ha  been correc l  ho gh  o o eigh ha  danger.  (ci ing Uni ed S a e  . Ma b r , 274 F.2d 899, 
902 03 (2d Cir. 1960))); Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 507 (finding that, although the jury need not be 
affirmatively instructed of its inherent power to nullify, the trial court erred by giving an instruction 
ha  e en iall  forbade he j r  from e erci ing i  po er of n llifica ion ). In he con e  of dea h 
penalty sentencing admittedly a unique scenario the Supreme Court has made clear that juries 
m  be allo ed moral la i de; n llifica ion in r c ion  ha  depri e he j r  of an adeq a e ehicle 
for e pre ing i  rea oned moral re pon e  o . . . mi iga ing e idence  are improper. Abdul-Kabir 
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 263 (2007) (quoting Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001)).  
96. Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 507. 
97. 880 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2017). 
98. Id. at 1026. 
99. Id. 
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erdic  con rar  o he la  gi en o [ hem] in hi  ca e. 100 That 
in r c ion, he Nin h Circ i  concl ded on appeal, co ld be construed to 
imply that nullification could be punished, particularly since the 
in r c ion came in he mid  of a criminal rial. 101 The court also 
in r c ed he j ror  ha  [ ]here i  no ch hing a  alid j r  
n llifica ion,  hich gge ed ha  they do not have the power to 
n llif , and o i  o ld be a ele  e erci e. 102 In doing both of those 
things, the Ninth Circuit held, the district court erred.103 
The line be een firm in r c ion  and impermi ible coercion i  a 
blurry one. Nearly the same instructions that the Ninth Circuit 
disapproved in Kleinman had passed muster in the Sixth Circuit.104 And 
just a year after its decision in Kleinman, in United States v. Lynch,105 the 
Ninth Circuit itself (in another marijuana case) approved anti-nullification 
in r c ion  ha  bo h in oked he j ror  oa h and arg abl  gge ed
by way of extracting individual promises from the jurors that they could 
not determine whether the law was just or unjust that nullification might 
be punishable.106 The co r  in ructions in Lynch were, as the dissent 
poin ed o , ma eriall  indi ing i hable  from ho e he co r  had 
disapproved in Kleinman, but the majority in Lynch concluded that the 
district court had not erred in providing them.107 The precise boundaries 
of what may and may not be said about nullification thus remain unclear 
across and even within jurisdictions.108 
                                                     
100. Id. at 1032.  
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 1032 33.  
103. Id. at 1033. 
104. United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988). In Krzyske, the district court 
re ponded o a j r  q e ion abo  he meaning of n llifica ion i h he follo ing: There i  no ch 
thing as valid jury nullification. Your obligation is to follow the instructions of the Court as to the law 
given to you. You would violate your oath and the law if you willfully brought in a verdict contrary 
o he la  gi en o  in hi  ca e.  Id. 
105. 903 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2018).  
106. Id. at 1079, 1088 89. In Lynch, the district court instructed jurors:  
Nullification is by definition a viola ion of he j ror  oa h hich, if o  are a j ror in hi  ca e, 
you will take to apply the law as instructed by the court. As a . . . juror, you cannot substitute 
your sense of justice, whatever it may be, for your duty to follow the law, whether you agree 
with the law or not. It is not your determination whether the law is just or when a law is unjust. 
That cannot be and is not your task. 
Id. at 1079. The court then asked each prospective juror if he or she could abide by that instruction, 
and each juror agreed to do so. Id. 
107. Id. at 1088.  
108. Petitions for certiorari were filed in both Kleinman and Lynch, but the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in both cases. Kleinman v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 113 (2018) (denying 
certiorari); Lynch v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2717 (2019) (denying certiorari).  
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For now, however, let us assume that we both understand and accept 
these basic rules: (1) a court need not and should not instruct a jury of its 
power to nullify; (2) a court may firmly admonish a jury that it should 
follow the law; but (3) a co r  ma  no  affirma i el  mi a e he j r  
power or threaten jurors with punishment. What happens on appeal if a 
trial court runs afoul of that third rule? The answer to that question will 
depend in large part upon whether the error is considered structural. 
II. WEAVER AND STRUCTURAL ERROR 
A. The (Relatively) New Kid on the Block: Harmless Error Analysis 
for Constitutional Violations 
[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a 
perfec  one. 109 When a trial has been fair but imperfect, the harmless error 
doctrine insulates convictions from reversal.110 Thus, where a court can 
confidently conclude that a minor error for example, an insignificant 
violation of a non-constitutional procedural rule did not influence the 
jury or affect the verdict, the conviction can be affirmed despite 
the error.111 
The harmless error doctrine was born in part from concern that accurate 
and fairly obtained convictions would be overturned for minor technical 
defects.112 To assuage that concern, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2111,113 
which provided that appellate courts should review lower court decisions 
i ho  regard o error  or defec  hich do not affect the substantial 
righ  of he par ie . 114 But the so-called harmle  error a e  did no  
shed much light on what types of errors would or would not affect 
substantial rights.115 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were later 
amended to implemen  he harmle  error a e, manda ing ha  [a]n  
error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial 
righ  m  be di regarded. 116 That rule, too, failed to explain which types 
                                                     
109. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). 
110. Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 
1793 (2017).  
111. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 65 (1946); see also Murray, supra note 110, at 
1799. 
112. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2032; Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002). 
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2111. 
114. Id.; Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2033 34. 
115. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2034. 
116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see also Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2034. 
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of errors might affect substantial rights.117 
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, it was largely assumed that 
constitutional errors were by definition harmful.118 After all, if a right was 
important enough to be enshrined in the Federal Constitution, it seems 
reasonable that its violation would nece aril  affec  he par ie  
b an ial righ . 119 Accordingly, constitutional errors automatically 
resulted in reversal.120 
Tha  changed i h he S preme Co r  1967 deci ion in Chapman v. 
California.121 In Chapman, the Supreme Court concluded that 
constitutional errors like other errors were subject to harmless error 
analysis.122 I  ob er ed ha  here ma  be ome con i ional error  
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and 
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be 
deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of 
the con ic ion. 123 
To avoid reversal on the basis of a constitutional error, the Court in 
Chapman held ha  he beneficiar  of a con i ional error  o ld ha e 
to demonstrate ha  he error a  harmle  be ond a rea onable 
do b . 124 Accordingly, an appellate court may affirm despite 
con i ional error if i  i  clear be ond a rea onable do b  ha  ch error 
did no  affec  he o come of he proceeding  or did no  con rib e to the 
erdic  ob ained. 125 
But the Court in Chapman al o ackno ledged ha  here are ome 
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never 
                                                     
117. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2034. 
118. Id. at 2035 36.  
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2111; FED. R. CRIM P. 52(a); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 
764 65 (1946) ( If, hen all i  aid and done, he con ic ion i  re ha  he error did not influence 
the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where 
he depar re i  from a con i ional norm or a pecific command of Congre .  (ci ing Br no . 
United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939))).  
120. Kamin, supra note 112, at 10; Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2035. 
121. 386 U.S. 18 (1967); see also Kamin, supra note 112, at 10; Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2035; 
Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 82 83. The Court foreshadowed Chapman  conclusion that even 
constitutional error could be harmless a few years before in Fahy v. Connecticut, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).  
122. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.  
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 24.  
125. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2036 37; see also United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1034
35 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the standard for affirming a conviction despite constitutional error 
is somewhat elevated compared to the harmlessness standard for non-constitutional errors, which 
allows affirmance if it is more probable than not that the error did not affect the verdict). 
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be rea ed a  harmle  error. 126 And with that, the idea of structural error 
was born.127 
B. The Rare Bird: Structural Error 
After Chapman, courts and commentators struggled to determine 
which constitutional errors should result in automatic reversal.128 
Chapman itself provided little clarity, defining an entire category of per 
se reversible constitutional error in a single sentence and footnote.129 The 
see, e.g.,  ci a ion in ha  foo no e gge ed hree righ  ho e iola ion 
would require per se reversal the protection against coerced confession, 
the right to counsel, and the right to an impartial judge.130 What else might 
q alif  a  an one  g e .131 
For about a quarter-century following Chapman, courts took an ad hoc 
approach when deciding whether a particular constitutional error should 
be subject to harmless error analysis.132 It was an odd task, requiring 
courts, without much guidance, to parse constitutional protections into 
first- and second-class rights.133 Courts struggled to determine which 
constitutional protections were negotiable and which were so fundamental 
to any conception of a fair trial that their violation was 
inherently harmful.134 
                                                     
126. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. In a footnote, the Court provided three examples of such rights: the 
prohibition against coerced confessions, the right to counsel, and the right to an impartial judge. Id. 
at 23 n.8.  
127. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2037. The decision in Chapman established the basic premise 
that certain constitutional errors were subject to harmless error analysis while others were not. 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. That latter category of error was dubbed structural  almost twenty-five 
years later, in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). See Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 
137 S. Ct. 1899, 1902 03 (2017).  
128. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a  2037 ( The diffic l  of de ermining hich error  can ne er be 
harmless and, thus, are reversible per se continues to present obstacles to achieving a coherent 
concep ion of harmle  error doc rine. ); S ac  & Da on, supra note 10, at 83 84 ( Commen a or  
writing in Chapman  immedia e af erma h ere ncer ain he her mo  con i ional error  o ld 
be treated under a harmless error rule rather than a rule of automatic reversal. Appellate courts 
likewise exhibited uncertainty regarding the specific rights to which Chapman applie . ).  
129. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.  
130. Id. 
131. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2037 38; Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional 
Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 426 27 (1980). 
132. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2038.  
133. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 90 (recognizing that singling out only certain 
constitutional violations for automatic reversal created a hierarchy of constitutional rights, and 
arg ing ha  [ ]here i  no hi orical or r c ral rea on o ppo e ha  he framer  in ended righ  
having truth-furthering purposes to carry more eigh  han righ  ha ing o her p rpo e ).  
134. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 75 n.1 (1983) (explaining that federal courts 
 
Yorke (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:54 PM 
2020] JURY NULLIFICATION AND STRUCTURAL ERROR 1461 
 
Over the ensuing years, a few constitutional protections cleared the 
hurdle to qualify as per se reversible error, while the vast majority did 
not.135 The Supreme Court applied harmless error analysis to a plethora of 
constitutional violations, including to jury instructions that misstated an 
element of the offense or contained improper presumptions, 
Confrontation Clause violations, admission of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and denial of counsel at preliminary 
hearings.136 In at least some of those cases, however, the Court did not 
provide a reasoned analysis as to why the particular error should or should 
not be subject to harmless error review.137 And the reasoning in other 
cases lacked rigor, asking whether the error rendered the trial 
f ndamen all  nfair  b  lacking a frame ork in hich o an er ha  
question.138 Contemporary commentators observed that the Court had 
failed o anno nce an  coheren  ra ionale a  o hich iola ion  are o be 
re ie ed b  he ric  a oma ic re er al  andard and hich b  he 
more lenien  harmle  error  andard. 139 
                                                     
had taken different approaches to assessing harmless error and had reached different results as to 
whether a particular error should be per se reversible).  
135. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2038; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 07 (1991). 
Errors deemed to be structural included denial of the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 342 44 (1963), denial of the right of self-representation, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 177 n.8 (1984), and denial of the right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 
(1984). 
136. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 342 44; see also Goldberg, supra note 131, at 427 28.  
137. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 54 (1970) (concluding without analysis that 
the admission of inadmissible evidence was harmless). 
138. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502 (1987) (noting that errors that render a trial 
fundamentally unfair should be automatically reversed, but concluding without rigorous analysis that 
incorrectly instructing the jury on an element of the charged crime did not render the trial 
fundamentally unfair). In Connecticut v. Johnson, the Court assessed the potential harm from the 
particular error at issue in order to determine whether that error should be subject to harmless error 
analysis at all. 460 U.S. at 86 87. Its conclusion illustrates the circularity: the erroneous instruction  
was no  o ill-suited to both the theory on which the case was tried and the evidence that was 
pre en ed,  ha  i  can be deemed harmle . . . . Such an error deprived respondent of 
con i ional righ  o ba ic o a fair rial ha  heir infrac ion can ne er be treated as harmless 
error.  
Id. at 87 88 (citation omitted). In other cases, the question of harmlessness bled into the question of 
whether an error occurred at all. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: 
When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1178 (1995) (explaining that courts 
ha e gone o far a  o incorporate the harmlessness inquiry into the determination of whether an 
error has even occurred  (empha i  in original)).  
139. Robert Pondolfi, Comment, Principles for Application of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 616, 616 (1974); see also The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 100, 107 (1986) ( The S preme Co r  ha  e  o de elop a coheren  andard for de ermining 
when a violation of the federal Constitution . . . ma  con i e harmle  error. ).  
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In Arizona v. Fulminante,140 a fractured and slim majority of the 
Supreme Court attempted to provide some coherence to the analysis.141 
S r e ing he ide range 142 of constitutional errors that had been 
subjected to harmless error review over the years, the Court looked for a 
common hread connec ing he e ca e . 143 That thread, the Court 
concl ded, a  ha  each in ol ed rial error error which occurred 
during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore 
be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in 
order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a 
rea onable do b . 144 In contrast, errors that were per se reversible were 
ho e ha  in ol ed r c ral defec  in he con i ion of he rial 
mechanism, which defy analysis by harmle -error  andard . 145 Such 
errors like the denial of the right to self-representation or a public trial
in ol ed a r c ral defec  affec ing he frame ork i hin hich he 
rial proceed , ra her han impl  an error in he rial proce  i elf. 146 
The Fulminante majority created what it couched as a bright-line rule: 
rial error  ere bjec  o harmle  error anal i ; r c ral defec  
were per se reversible.147 That rule, it posited, was merely the result of 
inductive reasoning a common hread 148 ari ing o  of a compari on 
of the constitutional violations which we have held subject to harmless 
error, and ho e hich e ha e held no . 149 
Ironicall , ho e er, he Co r  applica ion of he Fulminante rule 
immediately ran counter to the case that started it all, Chapman.150 In 
                                                     
140. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
141. Id. at 307 09. 
142. Id. at 306. 
143. Id. at 307. 
144. Id. at 307 08; see also Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 54 (1990) (improper 
aggravating circumstances instructions); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (improper 
jury instructions); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 04 (1987) (improper jury instructions); Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 574 76 (1986) (improper jury instructions); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 676 78 (1986) (Confrontation Clause violations); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) 
(denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 32 (1973) 
(Confrontation Clause violations); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 53 (1970) (admission of 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendmen ); Coleman . Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 11 
(1970) (denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing). 
145. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309.  
146. Id. at 310.  
147. See Gregory Mitchell, Against Overwhelming  Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless 
Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1994).  
148. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307. 
149. Id. at 310.  
150. Edwards, supra note 138, at 1177. 
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acknowledging that certain constitutional protections were so 
fundamental that their violation should result in per se reversal, Chapman 
had referenced the public trial right, the right to representation, and the 
protection against coerced confessions.151 Applying its new rubric, the 
Fulminante Court concluded that, despite Chapman  e plici  reference 
to coerced confessions, the admission of involuntary statements or 
confessions was a run-of-the-mill trial error and, as such, could 
be harmless.152 
Fulminante  ppo ed brigh  line a  a f ll  f  pon clo er 
inspection.153 Academic criticism of the distinction between trial errors 
and structural defects is legion,154 and rightfully so. Professor Justin 
Murray neatly summarized the analytical problems with Fulminante  
approach: 
The conceptual foundation of Fulminante is tenuous at best. The 
terms trial error and structural defect as used there refer, 
respectively, to errors or defects relating to the procedure or 
structure of a criminal trial. But error is virtually synonymous 
with defect in this context, and dictionary entries for procedure 
and structure suggest that trial procedure and trial structure 
likewise have similar meanings. Confusing matters further, the 
Supreme Cour  ha  endor ed e eral differen  and largel  
incon i en  in erpre a ion  of he rial/ r c ral-error 
dichotomy, each ambiguous in its own right and unable to explain 
which errors the Court has subjected to harmless error review and 
which it has not.155 
Di ing i hing be een rial error  and r c ral defec  a  h  
conceptually unsound and pragmatically unhelpful.156 No principled 
di inc ion e i  be een error  ha  occ r[red] during presentation of 
he ca e o he j r  and ho e ha  affec  [ ]he entire conduct of the trial 
                                                     
151. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). 
152. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295, 309 10. The reasoning in Fulminante also fails to square with 
some of the other errors that the Court had already deemed to be structural. See Steven M. Shepard, 
Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180, 1207 09 
(2008). 
153. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006); Alan Hirsch, Confessions 
and Harmless Error: A New Argument for the Old Approach, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 24 (2007). 
154. See Hirsch, supra note 153, at 3, 24 26; David McCord, The Trial / Structural  Error 
Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1413 14 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 4 (1994); Charles J. Ogletree, 
Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced 
Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 165 66 (1991).  
155. Murray, supra note 110, at 1807 08 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
156. Id. at 1809. 
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from beginning o end. 157 How is it that the impact of an improperly 
admitted coerced confession or a jury instruction that fails to include an 
element of the crime does not permeate the trial?158 Or, even if such a 
distinction could be made purely as a technical matter, is it necessarily 
more unfair to deny a defendant his (likely self-defeating)159 wish to 
represent himself than it is to admit a coerced confession or deny a 
defendant his right to cross-examine adverse witnesses? 
Although the analytical framework for distinguishing structural error 
from harmless error remained unclear post-Fulminante, with 
commentators questioning its essential wisdom, two things were apparent. 
First, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts were reluctant to add 
new constitutional rights to the ranks of structural error.160 Indeed, in the 
years following Fulminante, the Supreme Court classified only a small 
handful of constitutional violations as structural error.161 Second, as a 
general matter, harmless error review was proving to be an extremely 
important aspect of appellate decision making and the determinative 
factor in a huge number of cases.162 The question whether a particular 
error was subject to harmless error review thus remained a critical one, 
even as the means for answering that question remained unclear.163 
C. A Modicum of Clarity: The Supreme Court s Decision in Weaver 
The Supreme Court provided some much-needed guidance in its 2017 
decision in Weaver.164 While still purporting to affirm the basic premise 
                                                     
157. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307, 309 10. 
158. See Hirsch, supra note 153, a  25 ( Tha  di inc ion, ho e er, bordina e  reality to 
technicality. A wrongly admitted confession does indeed affect the entire trial from beginning to 
end. ). 
159. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984). 
160. Murray, supra note 110, at 1809 10. 
161. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2039; see also, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 
150 (2006) (denial of counsel of choice constitutes structural error); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 280 81 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instruction constitutes structural error).  
162. See, e.g., Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Foreword: Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 
63 BROOK. L. REV. 395, 395 (1997) ( The doc rine of harmle  error i  one of he mo  impor an  
doctrines in appellate decision making. Harmless error principles are employed in reviewing errors 
of all types, from improperly admitted evidence to serious constitutional errors. It is quite possible 
that these principles determine the outcome of more criminal appeals than any other doctrine . . . . ); 
Murray, supra note 110, a  1793 ( [W]hen co r  do perform harmle  error anal i , he  concl de 
ha  he error nder re ie  i  harmle  i h remarkable freq enc .  (foo no e omi ed)). 
163. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV, the argument has been made that designating 
an error as structural does not necessarily guarantee that the right at issue will be better protected. See 
infra Part IV. 
164. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).  
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of Fulminante, the Court delved more deeply into the rationales 
underlying the distinction between constitutional errors that warranted 
automatic reversal and those that did not.165 In doing so, the Court 
articulated three main categories of structural error. 
Fir , an error ma  be r c ral if he righ  a  i e i  no  de igned o 
protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some 
o her in ere . 166 Rights that fall under this paradigm include the 
defendan  righ  o elf-representation, which has little or nothing to do 
with truth-finding and everything to do with autonomy, whether wisely 
exercised or not.167 Beca e harm i  irrele an  o he ba i  nderl ing he 
righ , he Co r  ha  deemed a iola ion of ha  righ  r c ral error. 168 
Second, an error ma  be r c ral if he effec  of he error are impl  
oo hard o mea re. 169 The Court offered a  an e ample a defendan  
right to select his or her own attorney.170 The consequences of depriving 
a defendant of that right are difficult to assess.171 Accordingl , [b]eca e 
the government will, as a result, find it almost impossible to show that the 
error a  harmle  be ond a rea onable do b ,  he efficienc  co  of 
le ing he go ernmen  r  o make he ho ing are nj ified. 172 
Third, an error ma  be r c ral if he error al a  re l  in 
f ndamen al nfairne . 173 Examples of such errors include denial of 
representation to an indigent defendant or a failure to instruct the jury on 
reasonable doubt.174 Because the resulting trial is always a fundamentally 
nfair one, i  o ld be f ile for he go ernmen  o r  o 
show harmle ne . 175 
Some structural errors satisfy more than one of these rationales.176 For 
                                                     
165. Id. at 1907 08; see also Murray, supra note 110, at 1793 (identifying the rationales underlying 
harmless error review).  
166. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.  
167. Id. 
168. Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006)). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)). Other errors whose effects are 
nece aril  nq an ifiable and inde ermina e  incl de pro iding he j r  i h ri en in r c ion  
but failing to read those instructions aloud. United States v. Becerra, 939 F.3d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 
2019) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999)). 
171. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
172. Id. (citation omitted). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. Under a strict reading of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), failure to provide a 
reasonable doubt instruction would seem to be trial error because it occurs at the end of trial.  
175. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. 
176. Id. 
 
Yorke (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:54 PM 
1466 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1441 
 
example, violation of the right to a public trial is a structural error under 
both of the first two rationales articulated in Weaver.177 The public-trial 
righ  pro ec  ome in ere  ha  do no  belong o he defendan
namel , he righ  of he p blic a  large, and he pre , a  ell a  he 
righ  of he acc ed. 178 The effects of a violation of the public-trial right 
are also very difficult to measure.179 For both of those reasons, the error is 
structural even if it does not always result in fundamental unfairness.180 
In addition to clarifying the rationales for categorizing error as 
structural, the Court in Weaver also clarified the significance of 
designating an error as structural. When an objection to a structural error 
ha  been made a  rial and he error i  rai ed on direc  appeal, he 
defendan  generall  i  en i led o a oma ic re er al,  regardle  of he 
error  ac al effec  on he o come. 181 When, however, an error is not 
preserved at trial and is raised through an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim in federal habeas proceedings, the availability of automatic reversal 
depends on whether the error at issue in fact rendered the trial 
fundamentally unfair.182 Accordingly, although an error that satisfies any 
one of the rationales in Weaver may be deemed structural, not all 
structural errors are created equal. Only those that satisfy the third 
rationale fundamental unfairness result in automatic reversal in 
contexts other than direct appellate review.183 
III. COERCIVE ANTI-NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS 
SATISFY ALL THREE WEAVER CATEGORIES OF 
STRUCTURAL ERROR 
With these principles in mind, we return, then, to the central question 
of this Article. Suppose a trial court provides a coercive anti-nullification 
instruction to the jury, threatening it with punishment if it disregards the 
law and suggesting that an acquittal resulting from nullification would be 
invalid. Upon review of that error on direct appeal, should an appellate 
court ask whether the error was harmless, or should the error instead result 
in automatic reversal? In other words, do coercive anti-nullification 
                                                     
177. Id. at 1909.  
178. Id. at 1910.  
179. Id. 
180. Id.  
181. Id. at 1910 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)). 
182. Id. at 1911; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 70 (1997). 
183. See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 11; United States v. Becerra, 939 F.3d 995, 1005 06 (9th Cir. 
2019).  
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instructions qualify as structural error? 
The courts that have directly considered this question have concluded 
that coercive anti-nullification instructions do not amount to structural 
error.184 Most of those decisions pre-date Weaver, relying at times on a 
formalistic (and outdated) dichotomy between trial errors and structural 
defec  ha  doe  no  permi  a j r  in r c ion error to be considered a 
r c ral error. 185 A  lea  o deci ion , he Nin h Circ i  opinion  in 
United States v. Kleinman and United States v. Lynch, post-date 
Weaver.186 Contrary to those decisions, however, coercive anti-
nullification instructions should qualify as structural error under not just 
one, but all three, of Weaver  ra ionale . 
A. The Interests at Stake 
One rationale for deeming a constitutional error automatically 
reversible is that the right at issue was designed to protect an interest other 
han he defendan  in ere  in a oiding erroneo  con ic ion.187 Under 
those circumstances, asking whether the error prejudiced the particular 
defendant in other words, contributed to a possibly incorrect guilty 
verdict would be beside the point because the right requiring vindication 
was not aimed at ensuring the accuracy of criminal convictions.188 The 
prohibition on coercive anti-nullification instructions satisfies 
this rationale. 
We must first consider what is meant by the phrase erroneo  
con ic ion. 189 Weaver does not define the term.190 In common parlance, 
however, we think of an erroneous conviction as the conviction of a 
                                                     
184. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2017); State v. Smith-Parker, 340 
P.3d 485, 506 07 (Kan. 2014).  
185. United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 9 
( Unlike ch defec  a  he comple e depri a ion of co n el or rial before a bia ed j dge, an 
instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial 
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for de ermining g il  or innocence. ); Smith-Parker, 
340 P.3d at 506 07.  
186. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020; United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2018). Weaver was 
decided shortly after the panel issued its original opinion in United States v. Kleinman, 859 F.3d 825 
(9th Cir. 2017), which was later withdrawn and replaced with an opinion addressing Weaver. 
Compare Kleinman, 859 F.3d 825, with Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020. The Ninth Circuit has been a 
particularly fruitful source of decisions related to nullification in recent years, likely because states 
within its jurisdiction were among the first to pass medical marijuana laws and because of the political 
makeup of the populations within those states, which skews both liberal and antiauthoritarian.  
187. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.  
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 1903.  
190. Id. 
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defendant for a crime they did not, in fact, commit.191 Erroneous 
convictions often result from getting the facts wrong, whether because of 
mistaken eyewitness testimony, faulty or dishonest forensics, false 
confessions, unreliable informants, or simply poor defense 
representation.192 Therefore, the question here is whether the right at issue 
is aimed at preventing the conviction of defendants who did not actually 
commit the crimes charged. 
Rights that are designed to prevent erroneous convictions tend to be 
r h-f r hering  righ rights that seek to ensure that the fact-finding 
process is as accurate as possible.193 Numerous constitutional provisions 
are designed at least in large part to ensure the reliability of verdicts and 
protect against such fact-finding mistakes. For example, the Sixth 
Amendmen  g aran ee  of confron a ion and adeq a e repre en a ion 
help ensure that the jury has enough information to test the reliability of 
witnesses and evidence.194 
Rights concerned with other interests such as institutional soundness 
or notions of fair play end o be r h-ne ral  or r h-impairing. 195 
Examples of truth-neutral or truth-impairing rights include the Fourth 
Amendmen  pro ec ion again  nrea onable earch and ei re and he 
Fif h Amendmen  pri ilege again  elf-incrimination.196 Enforcing 
those rights might allow guilty defendants to go free, but they are 
important because they function as bulwarks against government 
overreach and misconduct.197 
So, what about the right at issue here? Appellate courts have been 
reluctant to delve into the precise nature of the constitutional violation that 
occurs when a trial court suggests that a jury lacks the power to or may be 
punished for acquitting, acknowledging only that the error implicates the 
Sixth Amendment.198 But there are at least two ways to understand the 
                                                     
191. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to 
Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 336 37 (2002) (discussing how DNA evidence 
can be used to exonerate someone who is legally innocent but was erroneously convicted). 
192. Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After a 
Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 841 (2010). 
193. See Murray, supra note 110, at 1811.  
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 79 (1986).  
195. Murray, supra note 110, at 1811 12; see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 87 90.   
196. Murray, supra note 110, at 1815 16, 1812 n.115; see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 
89. 
197. Un rpri ingl , no  all righ  fi  nea l  in o one bo . Some er e m l iple p rpo e : [T]he  
seek not only to foster the reliability of the fact-finding process, but also to promote other truth-neutral 
values such as participa ion or fair pla .  S ac  & Da on, supra note 10, at 89.   
198. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1087 88 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting) 
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violation that explain its constitutional scope and do not disturb (or at least 
only marginally ruffle) existing precedent. 
The best explanation and the one that aligns with existing 
precedent is that providing instructions that mislead or threaten the jury 
as to its power to acquit comes too close to issuing a directed verdict. This 
was the tack taken by the Kansas Supreme Court, which ruled 
ncon i ional a j r  in r c ion ha  e en iall  forbade he j r  from 
e erci ing i  po er of n llifica ion. 199 That instruction, the court 
concluded, fle  oo clo e o he n of direc ing a erdic  for he 
S a e. 200 When an instruction convinces jurors that they lack the power 
to acquit or will face punishment for doing so, the defendant is deprived 
of a meaningful trial by jury.201 While the jury may nominally deliver the 
verdict, it is the judge that has decided the question of guilt.202 Coercive 
anti-nullification instructions therefore approach a flat denial of the jury 
trial right enshrined in Article III203 and the Sixth Amendment.204 
A second way to conceive of the error here is that, while the defendant 
has no right to nullification, the jury itself has a right to perform its role 
as the arbiter of guilt or innocence, and the community has a right to 
meaningful participation in that process.205 By hamstringing the jury in 
performing its role, coercive anti-nullification instructions intrude upon 
he j r  area of e cl i e compe ence. Thi  a  of concep ali ing he 
violation aligns with the emerging scholarly understanding of the jury trial 
right as belonging not only to the defendant but to the jury and the 
community.206 It also comports with the historical understanding of the 
                                                     
(ackno ledging ha  j rie  ha e no righ  o n llif  b  e plaining ha  prohibi ing j rie  from 
e erci ing heir po er o do o can none hele  cro [] he con i ional line ). The fac  ha  co r  
have applied the harmlessness standard applicable to constitutional error harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, rather than just more likely than not confirms that the error at issue has a 
constitutional dimension. Id. at 1088 89. 
199. State v. Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d 485, 507 (Kan. 2014).  
200. Id. 
201. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the 
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 912 (1994) ( Pro agoni  in he con ro er  o er he j r  
authority to resolve legal questions shared much common ground. For one hing, no one di p ed he 
principle of noncoercion of j ror a principle ha  Chief J ice Va ghan  r ling in Bushell s Case 
had e abli hed in England in 1671.  (foo no e omi ed)). 
202. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 78 (1986). 
203. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
205. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a  2056 ( There i  ample ppor  for he ie  ha  he j r  ha  
institutional interests separate and distinct from that of the criminal defendant upon whose fate it 
delibera e . ); APPLEMAN, supra note 41, at 13 37. 
206. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a  2055 ( The e con i ional and radi ional in i ional 
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j r  a  a fairl  a onomo  bod  capable of deciding in he defendan  
favor all of the relevant questions factual, legal, moral presented by 
a case.207 
Under either conception of the violation, the right at issue concerns the 
Con i ion  g aran ee of rial b  a j r  ha  ha  he po er o make a 
meaningful choice about whether to acquit a particular defendant. The 
question, then, is whether the jury trial right itself was intended to prevent 
defendants from being convicted of crimes they did not actually commit, 
or whether it was instead designed primarily to protect some other interest. 
The Ninth Circuit squarely confronted this question in its 2017 decision 
in Kleinman.208 Asked whether improperly coercive anti-nullification 
instructions qualified as structural error, the court considered whether the 
right at issue was designed primarily to protect interests other than the 
defendan  in ere  in a oiding erroneo  con ic ion.209 The Ninth 
Circuit summarily dismissed the possibility that coercive anti-
nullification instructions satisfied this rationale for structural error. Its 
anal i  of he i e, in f ll: Plainly, the instant error was not of this kind, 
as the jury trial right it implicated is designed precisely to protect 
defendan  from erroneo  con ic ion. 210 But the answer is not as plain 
as Kleinman  r nca ed anal i  o ld gge . 
The righ  of rial b  j r  in criminal cases is fundamental to the 
                                                     
functions of the jury, many of which are separate and distinct from the role of securing the individual 
righ  of criminal defendan , ha e beg n o recei e he grea er recogni ion he  de er e. ); La ra I. 
Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 436 37 (2009); APPLEMAN, 
supra note 41, at 13 37. 
207. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 241 42 (1st ed. 2005) 
( Tho gh en -first-century judicial orthodoxy frowns on these claims of constitutional 
competence, the right of grand juries and trial juries to just say no in certain contexts draws strength 
from the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights. . . . [T]he Fifth Amendment . . . continues to shield any 
acq i al rendered b  a criminal j r . ); see also Howe, supra note 35, a  584 ( There ere . . . many 
ear  in o r hi or  hen j rie  ere pecificall  in r c ed ha  he  co ld di regard he j dge  
opinion of he la  and de ermine ha  ma er for hem el e . ). 
208. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2017). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. The court failed to include any citation in support of the proposition that the jury trial right 
i  de igned preci el  o pro ec  defendan  from erroneo  con ic ion.  See id. The timing of the 
Nin h Circ i  deci ion in Kleinman may explain the rather cursory analysis. The Ninth Circuit 
originally decided Kleinman in June 2017, shortly before the Supreme Court decided Weaver. United 
States v. Kleinman, 859 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2017) (withdrawn and superseded on rehearing). In that 
original opinion, the court had concluded that the error was not structural under Fulminante  rial 
error/structural defect distinction. Id. at 838. After Weaver was decided, the panel in Kleinman 
withdrew the original opinion and issued a new opinion, Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1033, which reached 
he ame concl ion nder he S preme Co r  ne  ar ic la ion of he andard  for r c ral error. 
Compare Kleinman, 859 F.3d at 835 38, with Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1031 36. 
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American cheme of j ice. 211 I  ha  been de cribed a  he pinal 
col mn of American democrac 212 and reflec [ ] a profo nd j dgmen  
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice 
admini ered. 213 The jury trial righ  i  he onl  g aran ee common o he 
12 state constitutions that predated the Constitutional Convention, and it 
has appeared in the constitution of every State to enter the Union 
hereaf er. 214 It is the only right to be enshrined in both the body of the 
Constitution and in the Bill of Rights.215 
Why were the Framers so excited about trial by jury? It was not because 
of any exceptional ability of juries to determine facts without error. 
Indeed, although it is difficult to study jury accuracy empirically, research 
tends to suggest that juries are not particularly accurate fact-finders.216 
That makes some intuitive sense. Juries are composed of laypeople of 
varying intelligence, experience, prejudices, and attention spans.217 And 
[ ]here i  li le e idence ha  reg lar people do m ch be er han chance 
a  epara ing r h from lie . 218 If the point was accuracy in other 
words, protecting defendants from erroneous convictions one can 
imagine the Framers designing a very different system that might not have 
included juries at all.219 
                                                     
211. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).  
212. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Fairfax, supra 
note 10, at 2052 (footnote omitted) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
213. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155.  
214. Neder, 527 U.S. at 31.  
215. Id. at 30. Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, of he Con i ion pro ide : The Trial of all 
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such trial shall be held in the state 
where the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth 
Amendment, in turn, pro ide : In all criminal pro ec ion , he acc ed hall enjo  he righ  o a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
216. See, e.g., Hal. R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 625, 625, 637 (2002) (arguing that the actual frequency of jury mistakes likely far 
exceeds what the public would consider to be tolerable levels of error); Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating 
the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 308 10 (2007) (explaining that 
indica or  of j r  acc rac  are q i e mode  compared o ha  one o ld ge  b  chance ); SAUL M. 
KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 14 15 (Barbara A. Bodling ed., 1st ed. 1988) (highlighting some of the difficulties in 
studying jury decision making); Fisher, supra note 27, at 578 79 ( There i  li le e idence ha  reg lar 
people [jurors] do much better than chance at separating truth from lie . ). 
217. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188 89 (Harlan, J., di en ing) ( Un rained j ror  are 
pre mabl  le  adep  a  reaching acc ra e concl ion  of fac  han j dge . ); Fi her, supra note 27, 
at 578 80. 
218. Fisher, supra note 27, at 578. 
219. See Blakel  . Wa hing on, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) ( Ul ima el , o r deci ion canno  rn 
on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice. One 
 
Yorke (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2020  3:54 PM 
1472 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1441 
 
Jury trials were important to the Framers because of the institutional 
role they play in our structure of government.220 A criminal defendan  
right to be tried by a jury acts as a check on national power and 
government overreach.221 Tho e ho ro e o r con i ion  kne  from 
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded 
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too 
responsive to the voice of higher authori . 222 Tha  [f]ear of nchecked 
power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, 
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community 
par icipa ion in he de ermina ion of g il  or innocence. 223 
Juries are thus a r c ral an ido e  o j dicial and legi la i e 
action.224 Indeed, i  i  anachroni ic o ee j r  rial a  an i e of 
individual right rather than (also, and more fundamentally) a question of 
go ernmen  r c re. 225 The j r  rial righ  a  de igned o g ard 
                                                     
can certainly argue that both these values would be better served by leaving justice entirely in the 
hands of professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those following civil-law traditions, 
ake j  ha  co r e. There i  no  one hred of do b , ho e er, abo  he Framer  paradigm for 
criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of 
limited state power accomplished by stric  di i ion of a hori  be een j dge and j r . ). 
220. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2053 ( The framer  a  he j r  a  he mean  for he ci i enr  
to hold ultimate sway over the judicial function of government, in the same way power was given, by 
mean  of he ballo , o er he legi la i e and e ec i e f nc ion .  (ci a ion omi ed)); Rachel E. 
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1015 (2006) ( E en 
these protections [aimed at ensuring an independent judiciary] were inadequate to the Framers, 
however. Although Article III judges are relatively more independent than Congress and the executive 
branch, they are still part of the government. Because separation of powers is concerned, among other 
things, with conflicts of interest, judges were not deemed sufficient protection against the possibility 
of state abuse in criminal cases because of their potential partiality toward the government. The 
Constitution therefore provides in Article III the Article establishing the judicial role in 
government ha  he rial of all crime  m  be b  j r . The j r  nre ie able power to acquit 
gives it the ability to check both the legislative and executive branches. And because federal juries 
must be unanimous, all representative members of the community must agree before political actors 
can impose criminal punishment. The jury, then, is a key component of the separation of powers in 
he criminal la .  (ci a ion  omi ed)).  
221. United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061,1087 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting). 
222. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.  
223. Id. 
224. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2055 (quoting Louis D. Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the 
Conservative Reformation, 94 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1354 (2006)). 
225. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 104 (1998). Jury trials also play an important role 
in maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. By enabling public participation in the 
conviction or acquittal of their fellow citizens, jury trials give the people a stake in enforcing criminal 
law. And giving the public a stake in the process increases the perceptions of legitimacy of the 
outcomes of that process. See generally AMAR, supra note 207 (discussing the role of the jury-trial 
right in enhancing community support). See also Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 825, 829 30 (2015).  
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again  a piri  of oppre ion and rann  on he par  of r ler ,  and a  
from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, 
a  he grea  b l ark of heir ci il and poli ical liber ie . 226 
The constitutional design of the jury trial is a clever one. Not only must 
crimes be tried by juries, but those juries must be from the locality in 
which the crimes were committed.227 And not only that, but a jury 
acquittal is essentially unassailable.228 
Those additional requirements that the jurors be local, that an 
acquittal be final have little to do with preventing erroneous 
conviction.229 But taken together, they have everything to do with 
preventing government overreach.230 Viewed jointly and in context, those 
pro ec ion  allo  j rie  o communicat[e] messages to the legislature 
regarding the wisdom of its laws, the judiciary regarding its sentencing 
and process oversight, and the executive regarding its enforcement and 
pro ec ion priori ie . 231 J rie  ac  a  he oice of he comm ni ,  
expressing moral judgment not only of the defendants who come before 
                                                     
226. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 11 (1995) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540 41 (4th ed. 1873)); Mitchell, 
supra note 147, a  1356 ( Al ho gh rial b  j r  er e  man  p rpo e  for he j ror  and he j ice 
system, the primary rationale for jury trial has consistently been that it serves as a bulwark against 
official rann .  (ci a ion omi ed)). 
227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see also Appleman, supra note 206, 
at 416, 427 37 (discussing the historical importance of the locality requirement).  
228. See AMAR, supra note 207, at 242; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 
569 71 (1977).  
229. Except in cases involving unique, difficult-to-understand local customs, there is little reason 
to believe that local jurors would be significantly better at determining facts from evidence than jurors 
from anywhere else in the nation. Rather, the requirement that juries be drawn from the local 
population was aimed at mitigating the tyrannical application of centralized government power. See 
Uni ed S a e  . L nch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1087 (9 h Cir. 2018) (Wa ford, J., di en ing) ( To member  
of he Fo nding genera ion i h fre h memorie  of he coloni  experience under royal judges, the 
j r  independence from con rol b  he j diciar  pro ided a rance ha  applica ion of na ional la  
would rest in the hands of local citizens attuned to the concerns of their community, not in the hands 
of officials beholden o a di an  cen ral go ernmen . ). The Do ble Jeopard  Cla e, U.S. CONST. 
amend. V, may help prevent erroneous convictions, but that is not the primary harm it seeks to 
prevent. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 88 (1957) ( [T]he S a e i h all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though 
innocen  he ma  be fo nd g il . ).  
230. See Lynch, 903 F.3d a  1087 (Wa ford, J., di en ing) ( [T]he Framer  of he Con i ion 
incl ded o pro i ion  ha  ac  a  a check on he na ional go ernmen  e erci e of po er in hi  
realm: one a ing ha  [ ]he Trial of all Crime , e cep  in Ca e  of Impeachmen , hall be b  J r ; 
he o her req iring ha  ch Trial hall be held in he S a e here he aid Crime  hall ha e been 
commi ed.  (q o ing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3)).  
231. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2054.  
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them but also of the criminal laws under which those defendants 
are prosecuted.232 
The intersection of the jury trial right, the venue clause, and the 
prohibition on double jeopardy creates a negative space in which juries 
can operate by moral, rather than legal, imperatives.233 Only in that void, 
which law cannot touch, can nullification occur. And history makes clear 
that that void is not some unintentional quirk of our founding documents, 
not an accidental black hole in the fabric of our constitutional universe, 
but a purposeful construct designed to check government overreach. 
Indeed, i  i  he j r  po er o n llif  [ ha ] allo  i  o ac  a  he 
con cience of he comm ni . 234 By acquitting in the teeth of the law 
and the facts, juries communicate to the judiciary, legislature, and 
e ec i e ha  he cen ral go ernmen  cond c  i  o  of ep i h 
community norms.235 [W]hen ci i en  on a j r  acq i  omeone de pi e 
their legal guilt, the jurors make a potent statement about a particular 
defendant or law, in the process transferring power from legislatures, 
j dge , and pro ec or  o a mall gro p of ci i en . 236 The power to 
resist what the jury views as unjust laws and draconian sentences to 
acquit or convict of a lesser offense when justice demands is a critical 
and pedigreed aspect of the jury trial right.237 
                                                     
232. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059; see also Carroll, supra note 225, at 830 ( In heir delibera ion  
and verdicts, they force the law out of the realm of the theoretical, into the space of their own lives. 
Juries, and the citizens who comprise [them], become active participants in governance
commanding he la  o re pond o he ci i en  i ion a  he ci izen seeks to conform to its strictures. 
This role of the jury in creating law, though small in its empire of a single verdict, nonetheless serves 
a critical democratic function grounding the law in the living world of the citizens whose obedience 
it command . ).  
233. See Carroll, supra note 33, a  662 ( The Con i ion  g aran ee of a righ  o a jury trial in 
criminal ca e  can al o be read a  crea ing a for m o redefine he la  i elf. ).  
234. Lynch, 903 F.3d at 1087 88 (Watford, J., dissenting) (quoting JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE 
JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 87 (1994)); see also United States v. Spock, 
416 F.2d 165, 182 (1  Cir. 1969) ( [T]he j r , a  he con cience of he comm ni , m  be permitted 
o look a  more han logic. ); Rachel E. Barko , Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury s 
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 63 64 (2003) 
( Injec ing he j r  in o he affair  of he j diciar  and gi ing it a nullification power that the judge 
does not possess gives the people a greater say on how criminal laws are applied . . . . Not only does 
this curb the authority of the judges themselves, but it also provides a check on the legislature and 
executive, which both serve broader constituencies that may not have the same interests as the jury 
dra n from he comm ni . ).  
235. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059 60. 
236. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 586 (2017). 
237. See, e.g., Jone  . Uni ed S a e , 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) ( Thi  po er o h ar  Parliamen  
and Crown took the form not only of flat-out acquittals in the face of guilt but of what today we would 
call verdicts of guilty to lesser included offenses, manifestations of what Blackstone described as 
pio  perj r  on he j ror  par .  (ci a ion omi ed)); Uni ed S a e  . Ga din, 515 U.S. 506, 510 
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Juries would not be an effective check on government if they could not 
freely acquit.238 The power to return an acquittal contrary to fact and law 
hen j ice o req ire  i  a  he hear  of j rie  r c ral hef . Were 
juries stripped of that power, they could defend the community against 
factually baseless charges, but they would be helpless in the face of unjust 
laws or draconian sentences. Without the ability to nullify, juries would 
be unable to meaningfully communicate to the government their moral 
disapproval of the law.239 They would be forced to deliver convictions that 
ran counter to community beliefs, forced to yield to centralized 
government so long as the government had instilled its values in law, 
ho e er rannical. For ha  rea on, n llifica ion i  an ancien  a pec  of 
he j r  preroga i e con ro er ial, e , b  f ndamen al o he j r  
structural importance.240 
The jur  in i ional p rpo e i  de ro ed hen a j dge hrea en  a 
jury with punishment for acquitting contrary to law or leads jurors to 
belie e ha  he  lack he po er o do o. Indeed, [ ]hrea  of p ni hmen  
b er  he j r  long anding role a  a afeguard against government 
oppre ion. 241 The rights at stake when that error occurs have little or 
nothing to do with reaching the correct verdict under the law. Rather, they 
have everything to do with ensuring that juries can fulfill their purpose in 
our constitutional framework by reflecting regional values, 
communicating disapproval of unjust laws, and acting as a check on 
government power.242 The injury is an institutional one, separate and apart 
from preventing the erroneous conviction of the particular defendant.243 
                                                     
(1995) ( The righ  o ha e a j r  make he l ima e de ermina ion of g il  ha  an impre i e 
pedigree. ).  
238. Barkow, supra note 220, a  1015 ( The j r  nre ie able po er o acq i  gives it the ability 
o check bo h he legi la i e and e ec i e branche . ). 
239. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059 60; see also Carroll, supra note 33, a  662 ( So hen j ror  
refuse to convict a defendant because they believe the law unjust (either generally or as applied), they 
exercise their proper power and role to check the formal government and to give the law meaning 
hro gh heir in erpre a ion. ).  
240. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059 60; see also United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1087 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (Wa ford, J., di en ing) ( One of he f ndamen al a rib e  of rial by jury in our legal 
system is the power of the jury to engage in nullification o re rn a erdic  of no  g il  in he ee h 
of bo h la  and fac .  (q o ing Horning . Di ric  of Col mbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920))).  
241. Lynch, 903 F.3d at 1088.  
242. See Goldberg, supra note 131, a  430 ( [T]he al e in ci i en par icipa ion ma  o eigh he 
value of a decisionmaking system which makes more correct decisions. In the law generally, and in 
criminal law particularly, the societal acceptability of the decision may be more important than its 
correctness. Juries represent an institutional insurance policy for the continued acceptability of the 
deci ionmaking em. ).  
243. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1760 n.58 
(2011) (explaining that the jury trial right does not belong purely to the defendant but instead 
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The institutional concerns here are very similar, if not identical, to those 
at play when a trial court directs the jury to issue a verdict of guilty. The 
Supreme Court has already said that a violation of the Sixth Amendment 
arising out of a directed verdict can never be harmless, no matter how 
rong he pro ec ion  e idence of g il .244 The Court has acknowledged 
that the j r  o erriding re pon ibili  i  o and be een he acc ed 
and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is in command of 
he criminal anc ion. 245 For that reason, even when the evidence of guilt 
is overwhelming, it matters from an institutional perspective whether 
the judge or the jury actually decides the case.246 Accordingl , harmle -
error analysis presumably would not apply if a court directed a verdict for 
he pro ec ion in a criminal rial b  j r . 247 
Similar concerns arise when a jury returns a guilty verdict after 
receiving coercive instructions. When a judge intimates that the jury lacks 
he freedom o acq i , he S a e canno  con end ha  he depri a ion a  
harmle  beca e he e idence e abli hed he defendan  g il ; he error 
in ch a ca e i  ha  he rong en i  j dged he defendan  g il . 248 An 
error springing from a coerced verdict should be automatically reversible 
for he ake of pro ec ing a ba ic righ ,  comple el  di inc  from an  
concerns about erroneous conviction.249 
In sum, the jury trial right at issue here is not, at its core, a truth-
furthering right. Its primary purpose is not to protect defendants from 
erroneous convictions; rather, its main purpose is institutional. To claim 
that the jury trial right is designed to protect defendants from erroneous 
conviction is to ignore the broader and more fundamental role that 
juries and their inherent power to nullify play in the structure of 
American governance. For that reason, coercive anti-nullification 
                                                     
implicates implicit rights held by the general public); State v. Moore, 179 Wash. App. 464, 468, 318 
P.3d 296, 299 (2014) ( [T]he co r  lack of remed  again  n llifica ion i  no  beca e he j r  lack  
a d  o phold he la . The co r  doe  no  inq ire in o he j r  erdic  o  of re pec  for o r 
judicial system.  (ci a ion omi ed)). 
244. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).  
245. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977).  
246. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.  
247. Id.; see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991); Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 33 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
248. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578; see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that an 
error ari ing o  of a direc ed erdic  o ld be per e reversible no matter how overwhelming the 
nfa orable e idence  (empha i  omi ed)); S lli an . Lo i iana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) 
( [A]l ho gh a j dge ma  direc  a erdic  for he defendan  if he e idence i  legall  in fficien  o 
establish guilt, he ma  no  direc  a erdic  for he S a e, no ma er ho  o er helming he e idence. ).  
249. Neder, 527 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.  
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instructions satisfy the first of Weaver  ra ionale  for r c ral error. 
B. Difficulties with Measuring the Effects 
Coercive anti-nullification instructions also satisfy Weaver  econd 
rationale for structural error: the effects of such an error are very difficult 
to measure. 
Determining whether a constitutional error is harmless requires an 
assessment of whether the error affected the verdict. A non-structural 
con i ional error doe  no  req ire re er al of he con ic ion if he S a e 
c[an] ho  be ond a rea onable do b  ha  he error complained of did 
no  con rib e o he erdic  ob ained. 250 In assessing the effect of the 
error, he re ie ing co r  con ider[ ] he na re of he iola ion and he 
con e  in hich i  occ rred,  aking in o acco n  e eral fac or  
depending on the type of violation at issue.251 Although the analysis is 
multi-face ed, [ ]he reng h of he pro ec ion  ca e i  probabl  he 
ingle mo  cri ical fac or. 252 Indeed, [c]a e  ha  ha e pheld 
convictions rendered on incomplete or erroneous jury instructions have 
relied on rong and con incing e idence  ha  he pro ec ion ha  
adeq a el  pro ed [i  ca e]. 253 
Those standards are inapplicable here. Errors involving coercive anti-
n llifica ion in r c ion  def  anal i  for harmle ne  for a  lea  
three reasons.254 
First, the possible effect of an improper anti-nullification instruction on 
                                                     
250. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 28 (1967)).  
251. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 
1162, 1167 68 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) 
(explaining multi-factor harmless error analysis in the context of Confrontation Clause violations); 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 ( In hi  i a ion, here a re ie ing court concludes beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that 
the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found 
to be harmless. We hink i  be ond ca il here ha  he error did no  con rib e o he erdic  
ob ained.  (q o ing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 
1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the omission of an element of a crime from a jury instruction is 
harmless when that element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence).  
252. Reifler, 446 F.3d at 87; see also 3A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 854, at 305 (2d ed. 1982) ( Perhap  he ingle mo  ignifican  fac or 
in weighing whether an error was harmful, although not the only one, is the strength of the case against 
he defendan .  (foo no e omi ed)). Profe or M rra  provides a detailed explanation of the way that 
results-oriented harmless error analysis in other words, affirming when the evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming persists despite courts  semantic adherence to neutrally examining the effect of the 
error on the verdict. Murray, supra note 110, at 1803 05.  
253. United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2015). 
254. United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061,1089 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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the verdict cannot be assessed by any rubric that takes into account the 
reng h of he pro ec ion  ca e. Tha  i  o beca e of he niq e na re 
of the nullification power. Given that nullification allows jurors to acquit 
in the teeth of the law and the facts, nullification is salient precisely when 
he go ernmen  ca e i  rong. Accordingl , he fac  ha  o er helming 
evidence supported a conviction should not suggest that an erroneous anti-
nullification instruction had no effect on the verdict.255 
Indeed, foc ing on he reng h of he go ernmen  ca e in he 
harmless error analysis leads to circular reasoning and perverse results in 
the context of coercive anti-n llifica ion in r c ion . The Nin h Circ i  
decision in Kleinman provides a perfect example.256 There, the court 
considered whether an improper anti-nullification instruction affected the 
guilty verdict that the jury ultimately delivered.257 The court began with 
the premise that the instruction was unconstitutionally coercive.258 But 
because the jury had no right to nullify and ample evidence supported 
its finding of guilt the court concluded that the error was harmless.259 
The court reasoned that the instruction: 
[W]as only coercive insofar as it implied recrimination in the 
event a verdict was reached contrary to the law. Because the 
Government has shown that the verdict was reached in a manner 
consistent with the law, we are confident that the instruction had 
no effec  on he j r  erdic . The erdic  o ld ha e been he 
same absent the di ric  co r  error, beca e he e idence of 
Kleinman  g il  o ld ha e been he ame, he j dge  
instructions on the law would have been the same, and the jury 
would have had no more right to reach a nullifying verdict than it 
did here.260 
The circ lari  of he co r  reasoning highlights the difficulty with 
applying harmless error review in this context. Because the evidence of 
guilt was overwhelming and the jury was correctly instructed on the 
                                                     
255. To the contrary (and perhaps counterintuitively), a coercive anti-nullification instruction may 
be more likely to have affected the verdict when the evidence against a defendant was strong. That is 
so because, under those circumstances, jurors could have only returned an acquittal by nullifying 
rather than by resolving disputed facts in the defendant s favor.  




260. Id.; see also id. a  1034 ( The error did no  lea e  i h no objec , o o peak, pon hich 
harmle  error cr in  can opera e,  ince e ill ha e a proper j r  erdic  and ma  de ermine 
he her he n llifica ion in r c ion pla ed an  ignifican  role in he j r  finding of guilt beyond 
a rea onable do b .  (ci a ion omi ed)).  
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substantive law (aside from the anti-nullification instruction), the court 
assumed that the jury would have reached the same verdict regardless of 
the error.261 But the point of prohibiting directed verdicts and punishment 
of jurors as well as instructions suggesting the same is that the court 
must leave room for the jury to deliver a verdict contrary to the law. 
Asking whether the verdict actually delivered was supported by the 
evidence in other words, within the law is beside the point.262 The 
Kleinman co r  rea oning h  render  error re l ing from coercive 
anti-nullification instructions not just subject to harmless error review but, 
in fact, per se harmless. 
Imagine that the court had actually threatened the jurors with jail or had 
simply directed the jury to issue a guilty verdict. The harmlessness 
analysis the Kleinman court undertook would be essentially unaltered. 
After all, he e idence of Kleinman  g ilt would have been the same, 
he j dge  in r c ion  on he la  o ld ha e been he ame, and he j r  
would have had no more right to reach a nullifying verdict than it did 
here. 263 Strictly applying the principles articulated in Kleinman, the 
conviction would likely be affirmed.264 But it cannot be that such an 
error which runs contrary to some of our most foundational principles
would be without remedy.265 
Viewed another way, the improper instructions shifted the locus of 
decision making from the jury to the judge. The effect of that error is 
likewise very difficult to measure, and it cannot be determined from 
e amining he reng h of he pro ec ion  ca e. Like depri a ion of he 
                                                     
261. See Murray, supra note 110, a  1820 ( [R]e l -based harmless error review bears the potential 
to systematically deprive redress for result-independent, non-truth-furthering interests in cases where 
the evidence of guil  i  o er helming. ). 
262. As Judge Watford put it in his dissent in Lynch, [ ]he harmle ne  inq ir  in hi  con e  
can  rn on an e al a ion of he reng h of he go ernmen  e idence; b  definition, nullification 
in ol e  a j ror  deci ion o acq i  no i h anding he reng h of he e idence.  Uni ed S a e  . 
Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018). 
263. Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1034. 
264. I am close to giving Kleinman short shrift here in the interest of making a point. It is possible 
that the severity of the improper threat or its repetition might have convinced the Kleinman court to 
reverse under these circumstances. The court did take into account that the instructions at issue in that 
case were not emphasized and were only a small part of the final instructions. Id. But a bulk of the 
court s analysis focused on the fact that the jury correctly understood the substantive law, and the 
evidence of guilt was substantial, and that fundamentally jurors had no right to return a verdict 
contrary to law. Id. Those aspects of the analysis would apply equally no matter how grievous the 
error. 
265. Indeed, we already know that a directed guilty verdict should result in automatic reversal 
without regard for the strength of the prosecution s case. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986). To 
the extent that an instruction is coercive enough to deprive the jury of a meaningful opportunity to 
acquit, automatic reversal should similarly be required.  
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right to counsel of choice, the effect of shifting decisional power from the 
j dge o he j r  i  en irel  nrela ed o he reng h of he pro ec ion  
case and impossible to measure with any certainty.266 Harmle -error 
analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might 
have occurred in an alternate universe. 267 
The unique nature of the error here thus renders irrelevant the strength 
of he go ernmen  ca e. A emp ing o appl  radi ional harmle ne  
analysis, in which that factor is dominant, leads us down a nonsensical 
path. And the fact this error fits so poorly into traditional methods of 
harmlessness analysis suggests that it is not amenable to harmless 
error review. 
Second, even if we presume that a court could conduct some kind of 
harmle ne  re ie  ha  e ci ed he reng h of he pro ec ion  ca e 
from consideration,268 the effects of this particular type of error would 
nonetheless remain difficult to measure.269 If nullification is a worrisome 
enough possibility such as in federal prosecutions where the conduct at 
issue is legal under state law that the court feels compelled to issue 
coercive anti-nullification instructions, it seems unlikely that the 
government would be able to prove that such an instruction had no effect 
on the verdict without relying on the strength of its case to do so.270 Given 
that juries return general verdicts and that their deliberations occur within 
a black box, it would seem impossible to assess what effect a coercive 
anti-nullification instruction had on the verdict.271 Could the government 
                                                     
266. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (noting that because the effect 
of deprivation of choice of counsel cannot be measured, it qualifies as structural error). 
267. Id. 
268. This is a questionable proposition. See Daniel J. Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless 
Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 135, 143 (1976) (noting that the harmless error analysis assesses the 
b  for  effec  of he error, nder hich he probabili  of g il  gi en he [ n ain ed] 
evidence[] . . . i  ab ol el  nece ar  o arri e a  an in elligen  concl ion regarding he error  effec  
on he erdic  (ci ing Harring on . California, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
269. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) ( [T]he j r  g aran ee being a ba ic 
pro ec io[n]  ho e preci e effec  are nmea rable, b  i hout which a criminal trial cannot 
reliabl  er e i  f nc ion.  (foo no e omi ed)); Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150 (finding an error 
i h con eq ence  ha  are nece aril  nq an ifiable and inde ermina e[] nq e ionabl  q alifie  
a  r c ral error  (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 282)).  
270. United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018). 
271. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (effect of discrimination in choosing the 
grand j r  co ld no  be mea red, in par  beca e he j r  delibera ion and mo i a ion  are hidden 
from re ie ); Alli on Orr Lar en, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1572 73 
(2011) ( Perhap  he defining fea re of a j r  delibera ion i  ha  i  ake  place in ecre : a e  of 
strangers are charged with assigning criminal liability to an individual, are told that they can keep 
their discussions private, and are not required to provide reasons for their final judgment. Courts are 
adaman  abo  pro ec ing he m er  and ecrec  of he black bo ; j r  di c ion  are among he 
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establish harmlessness by showing that support for the state law was a 
mere 51%, or that the particular jurors in the case voted against the state 
law, or that the jurors themselves were generally rule-following and law-
abiding and therefore unlikely to nullify? Probably not. Most of that 
information would be outside the appellate record, not to mention 
patently inappropriate.272 
Which brings us to the third problem with measuring the effects of 
improper nullification instructions: doing so would force courts to wade 
into troubled and decidedly unjudicial waters. An error of this type would 
be reversible only if there was a fair chance that the jurors would have 
disregarded the law absent the erroneous instruction. Assessing 
harmlessness in this context would thus require courts to assess how much 
a particular community disagreed with the governing law and how likely 
members of that community were to disregard the law. Answering those 
questions would not only be difficult and murky, it would also require 
irring p a poli ical and ocial horne  nest. And perhaps most 
importantly, it would turn basic principles of judicial review on 
their heads. 
Courts generally assume that jurors follow their instructions.273 They 
also generally assume absent something like a constitutional 
challenge that the laws they enforce are valid ones.274 But assessing 
harmlessness in this context would require the court to toss those 
presumptions aside to consider the validity and prevalence of policy 
objections to the law, the level of public respect for government and 
                                                     
mo  pri a e and pri ileged in o r legal em.  (ci a ion omi ed)); see also FED. R. EVID. 606 
(generally precluding jurors from revealing the content of their deliberations).  
272. Assuming that the state could not rely on such information nor on the strength of its case, it 
would be nearly impossible for the government to demonstrate harmlessness when the law under 
which the defendant was prosecuted was unpopular. See Lynch, 903 F.3d a  1089 ( A  lea  in ca e  
like this one, where nullification was an obvious possibility given the popularity of medical marijuana 
in California, I don  ee ho  he go ernmen  co ld e er pro e ha  a co r  nd l  coerci e an i-
n llifica ion in r c ion had no effec  on he o come. ). Accordingly, in such situations, these errors 
would become per se harmful in practice a roundabout and less rigorous way of arriving at an 
automatic reversal rule.  
273. See, e.g., Richard on . Mar h, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) ( The r le ha  j rie  are pre med 
to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the 
presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the 
interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal jus ice proce . ); Franci  . Franklin, 471 U.S. 
307, 325 n.9 (1985) ( [W]e adhere o he cr cial a mp ion nderl ing o r con i ional em of 
rial b  j r  ha  j ror  caref ll  follo  in r c ion . ). 
274. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ( The general r le 
i  ha  legi la ion i  pre med o be alid. ). Co r  al o a oid poli ical q e ion . See Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 96 (2012). Although that doctrine is not strictly 
implicated here, its pragmatic foundation is relevant.  
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procli i  for follo ing j dge  in r c ion , and he likel  p chological 
effects of being charged with enforcing a law with which one disagrees or 
threatened with punishment for disregarding it.275 It is difficult to see how 
appellate courts could engage in internally consistent reasoning if, in this 
particular context, they were forced to disregard some of their most 
fundamental assumptions.276 
Courts are intellectually and analytically capable bodies, so it is 
possible that they could undertake this analysis. But even if they could, 
should they? Doing so would require detailed inquiry into sensitive and 
nebulous subjects in which courts are not experts, including in-depth 
discussion and assessment of public opposition to particular laws. Given 
he j ror  pri acy interests and the zealousness with which courts and 
legislatures have guarded the secrecy of juror deliberations,277 the analysis 
would necessarily be broadly statistical and probabilistic (perhaps based 
on legislative history and judicially noticeable documents establishing the 
popularity of relevant laws). But this type of reasoning is precisely the 
kind that courts have tried to avoid when determining whether to uphold 
the conviction of a particular individual.278 And opining on whether jurors 
in a particular state would have been likely to disregard a federal law 
might give the rather improper appearance that the court itself either 
approves or disapproves of the law at issue.279 
                                                     
275. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (stating that where assessing 
the effect of the error requires speculative and nebulous inquiry, harmless error analysis is untenable).  
276. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 5 SUP. CT. 
REV. 195, 206 07 (1989) ( [C]o r , par ic larl  appella e co r , pre me a ra ional j r  ha  ill 
act in accordance with the instructions given it. . . . [I]t is difficnlt [sic] to see how any other premise 
could be employed in a systematic way a  a ba i  for j dicial rea oning.  (ci a ion  omi ed)); J rek 
. Te a , 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (Whi e, J., conc rring) ( [I]  ho ld no  be a med ha  j rie  
ill di obe  or n llif  heir in r c ion . ). 
277. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent 
Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 835 (1998) ( [W]hen i  come  o j r  erdic , e canno  do he 
equivalent of throwing open the hood and looking at the engine, because we are deeply committed to 
he ecrec  of j r  delibera ion . ).  
278. See Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and 
Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1050 (1988); 
Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1985); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, a  133 ( [A] co r  ho ld no  
uphold a conviction or conclude that a defendant has not shown the requisite level of outcome-
infl encing prej dice hen he co r  j dgmen  i  ba ed on i  o n probabili ic impre ion  of ha  
a j r  ac all  did or ha  a h po he ical rea onable j r  i  likel  o do. ); see also Howard v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 
532 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1980). 
279. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ( [J] ice m  a i f  he appearance of 
j ice. ); Sa l M. Ka in, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 687, 687 (1990); KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 216, at 13 14; Erin York Cornwell, 
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Moreover, to the extent that we agree that jury nullification is lawless 
behavior,280 we cannot expect appellate courts, trained so rigorously in the 
dialectic of law, to dive headfirst into that lawlessness. Indeed, the duality 
of nullification anarchic and institutional, merciful and prejudiced is 
likely part of the reason appellate courts have been so reluctant to talk 
about it even as a general matter or to allow trial courts to discuss it with 
jurors. Asking courts to pinpoint the probability of nullification in any 
given case, and the likelihood that particular instructions prevented it, 
would force courts to engage in analysis that is antithetical to the basic 
ene  of j dicial deci ion making. And pplan ing he appella e co r  
moral (rather than legal) judgment for a decision the jury should have 
freely made would not allevia e he harm done o he j r  in i ional 
role.281 Appellate courts are thus uniquely ill-suited to assess harmlessness 
in this context. 
In sum, the effect of error arising out of coercive anti-nullification is 
impossible to measure with any certainty. Even attempting to do so leads 
to circular reasoning and speculation. Accordingly, error arising out of 
coercive anti-nullification instructions also satisfies Weaver  econd 
rationale for structural error. 
C. Fundamental Unfairness 
Finally, coercive anti-nullification instructions satisfy the third Weaver 
rationale for structural error.282 Because this type of error always results 
in fundamental unfairness, it qualifies as structural error of the 
highest order. 
Coercive anti-nullification instructions implicate one of the 
fundamental aspects of our criminal justice system and one of the basic 
principles upon which the Framers most strongly insisted. As Alexander 
Hamilton put it: 
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they 
                                                     
Opening and Closing the Jury Room Door: A Sociohistorical Consideration of the 1955 Chicago Jury 
Project Scandal, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 49, 59 60, 67 69 (2010); see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 
107, 125 (1987). 
280. Compare Uni ed S a e  . Pere , 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7 h Cir. 1996) ( An nrea onable j r  
verdict, although unreviewable if it is an acquittal, is lawless, and the defendant has no right to invite 
he j r  o ac  la le l . ), with Brown, supra note 16, at 1150 (discussing the ways in which 
nullification can be considered to occur within the parameters of the rule of law).  
281. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a  2031 ( [I]f he j r  i  o re ain an  emblance of i  in ended 
constitutional function, appellate courts must respect the institutional interests of the jury, which 
canno  be f r her bordina ed o he pragma ic al e  he harmle  error r le ad ance . ). 
282. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).  
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agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon 
the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it 
consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to 
liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free 
government.283 
Trial by a jury stripped of the power to freely acquit eviscerates some 
of the central purposes of the jury trial right itself to act as a check on a 
distant government and to speak as the moral voice of the community.284 
When a judge instructs the jury that it may be punished if it disregards the 
law or that a verdict resulting from such disregard would be invalid, the 
balance of power in adjudicating guilt improperly shifts from the jury to 
the judge.285 Indeed, the mere act of providing such a forceful 
instruction although ostensibly result-neutral in fact may suggest that 
the judge believes the legally correct result is conviction and that an 
acquittal will necessarily imply juror misconduct. Any time such an 
instruction is relevant, the context will probably make clear to the jurors 
that the judge is warning them against acquitting despite 
overwhelming evidence. 
J ror  are likel  o ake ch arning  erio l . Indeed, [ ]he 
influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great 
eigh ,  and j ror  are e er a chf l of he ord  ha  fall from him. 
Par ic larl  in a criminal rial, he j dge  la  ord i  ap  o be he 
deci i e ord. 286 Moreover, jurors who are threatened with punishment 
acquire a perceived personal stake in the outcome of the case because an 
acquittal against the law could, according to the judge, result in personal 
consequences. That perceived personal stake in the outcome further 
ndermine  he j r  independence and di or  he ba ic frame ork of 
the trial.287 
                                                     
283. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 521 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 
1961); see also Fairfax, supra note 10, a  2073 ( No con i ional al e i  more f ndamen al han 
he frame ork of go ernmen  ha  hel er  he poli ical and ci il righ  e hold o dearl . The j r  
institutional role in that structure must be jealously guarded, lest our desire for efficiency overshadow 
o r need for liber . ). 
284. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059.  
285. See Neder . Uni ed S a e , 527 U.S. 1, 39 (1999) (Scalia, J., di en ing) ( Wha  co ld po ibl  
be so bad about having judges decide that a jury would necessarily have found the defendant guilty? 
Nothing except the distrust of judges that underlies the jury- rial g aran ee.  (empha i  in original)).  
286. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) (citation omitted). 
287. See United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 
474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) ( When con i ional error call  in o q e ion he objec i i  of ho e 
charged with bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court can neither indulge a presumption 
of reg lari  nor e al a e he re l ing harm. ); T rner . Lo i iana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 72 (1965) 
( In e ence, he righ  o j r  rial g aran ee  o he criminall  acc ed a fair rial b  a panel of 
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The problem with this type of error and with directed verdicts as 
well is less about unfairness to any particular defendant and more about 
the damage wrought to the institution.288 The cornerstone of trial by jury 
is that the jury truly be the ultimate arbiter of culpability and that it engage 
in that task with a sense of independence.289 Juries who instead labor in 
fear, threatened with possible punishment based on the verdict they return, 
are not fulfilling their institutional role.290 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 
observed that: 
[j]urors cannot fairly determine the outcome of a case if they 
belie e he  ill face ro ble  for a concl ion he  reach a  
jurors. The threat of punishment works a coercive influence on 
he j r  independence, and a j ror ho genuinely fears 
retribution might change his or her determination of the issue for 
fear of being punished.291 
Errors resulting from instructions that instill fear or a sense of futility 
in j ror  a  o heir choice of erdic  h  go o he er  e ence of the 
j r  iden i  and f nc ion. 292 [W]hen j rie  differ i h he re l  a  
which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving 
some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which they 
are no  emplo ed. 293 Coercing jurie  o abandon heir abili  o find a 
erdic  of g il  or no  g il  a  heir o n con cience  ma  direc  
intrudes upon one of the most important aspects of the jury trial right.294 
Deeming such an error harmless would therefore undermine the 
fundamental institutional interests protected by Article III and the 
Sixth Amendment. 
It might seem odd when discussing fundamental fairness to focus on 
                                                     
impar ial, indifferen  j ror . The fail re o accord an acc ed a fair hearing iola e  e en he minimal 
standards of due proce .  (q o ing Ir in . Do d, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961))).  
288. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (explaining that an error resulting from a directed 
verdict in favor of the prosecution would not be subject to review for harmlessness because the 
reng h of he pro ec ion  ca e i  imma erial hen he rong en ity has judged the defendant 
guilty).  
289. See Uni ed S a e  . Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1  Cir. 1969) ( The con i ional g aran ee  
of due process and trial by jury require that a criminal defendant be afforded the full protection of a 
j r  nfe ered, direc l  or indirec l . ). 
290. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d at 950. 
291. Id.  
292. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2066; see also id. a  2060 ( When an ninformed or mi informed 
jury returns a verdict of guilty, it is not only the criminal defendant who suffers harm (whether or not 
he appella e co r  belie e  ch defendan  ha  been prej diced), b  he j r  i elf. ).  
293. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).  
294. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 15 (1995) (citation omitted). 
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institutional concerns instead of concerns relating to the particular 
defendant or to criminal defendants more generally. But that focus is in 
keeping with the modern jurisprudential trend towards recognizing the 
jury trial right as a collective or institutional right rather than as an 
individual one a rend ha  re rn  o he Framer  original ie  on he 
subject.295 In cases like Apprendi v. New Jersey296 and Jones v. United 
States,297 the Court has emphasized the importance of the jury trial right 
from an institutional perspective and recognized the broader injury that 
intrinsically results from violations of that right.298 Th , in modern ime  
the Court has indicated that the boundaries of the right to a jury trial 
ho ld be con r c ed aro nd con idera ion  of he j r  p rpo e. Thi  
ne er, f nc ionali  concep ion of he j r  role i  more compa ible i h 
nullification. 299 
Accordingly, the issue here is not that a coercive anti-nullification 
in r c ion depri e  he defendan  of ome ab rac  en i lemen  o he 
l ck of a la le  deci ionmaker. 300 Were that the crux of the matter, it 
would be difficult or impossible to argue that trial by a jury stripped of the 
                                                     
295. As Akhil Amar explains,  
In he en ie h cen r , he S preme Co r  began o di regard he plain meaning of hall  and 
all  in he Ar icle III jury-and-venue clause, treating the issue as merely one concerning the 
waivable righ  of he criminal defendan . B  he Fo nder  j r -and-venue rules had deeper 
roots. Trials were not just about the rights of the defendant but also about the rights of the 
community. 
AMAR, supra note 207, at 236 37; see also APPLEMAN, supra note 41, a  15 ( [R]e rning o hi orical 
origins eache   ha  he righ  o a j r  rial i  gro nded in he comm ni  cen ral role of deciding 
p ni hmen  for criminal offender  and in i  abili  o de ermine moral blame or hine . ). For an 
interesting perspective positing that the jury trial right should be interpreted not as the Framers saw it 
but as it was understood during the Reconstruction era, see Bressler, supra note 19. 
296. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
297. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
298. Id. at 245; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; see Appleman, supra note 206, at 400; Fairfax, supra note 
10, at 2055 56; see also Carroll, supra note 33, at 659; Louis D. Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the 
Conservative Reformation, 94 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1354 (2006) ( The recen  ca e , f r hermore, end o 
focus on justice as perceived from the perspective of our institutions and the public that has some 
moral stake in their operation, rather than from the perspective of the criminally accused individual. 
The Apprendi line of opinion , for in ance, re e  he j r  hi orical impor ance a  a r c ral 
antidote to judicial power rather than the value of lay decisionmaking as a bulwark of liberty for 
indi id al . The empha i  i  on he em  e plici  and implici  pro e a ion  and he percep ion  
of legi imac  ha  follo . ).  
299. Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 975 77 (2006); see also Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury 
Nullification: A Call for Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 137 (1993). 
300. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 95 (1984) (discussing the prejudice 
determination in the context of reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding). 
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right to nullify always results in fundamental unfairness.301 Rather, the 
fundamental unfairness results from the damage wrought to the institution 
and o he p blic  collec i e righ  o rial b  a j r  nfe ered. 302 That 
damage results each and every time this particular error occurs, suggesting 
that fundamental unfairness to our institutions, to the public always 
results from coercive anti-nullification instructions.303 This error therefore 
also satisfies Weaver  hird ra ionale for r c ral error. 
IV. SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
Given that several courts have treated coercive anti-nullification 
instructions as amenable to harmless error review, reasonable minds can 
disagree about whether such instructions constitute structural error. 
Reasons for disagreement likely span both analytical and pragmatic 
objections. I briefly explore some of those possible objections here. 
A. Analytical Objections 
Perhaps the most obvious analytical objection to categorizing coercive 
anti-nullification instructions as structural error goes something like this: 
Courts across the country have made clear that a defendant has no right to 
nullification. Automatic reversal should be for only the most profound 
errors, so why should it apply here, where the error has cost the defendant 
only the possibility of an acquittal by nullification, to which he had no 
right in the first place? 
Certainly that argument has some intuitive appeal, and it seems to have 
gained traction in the courts. For example, this view runs throughout the 
Nin h Circ i  opinion in Kleinman. In determining that errors of this 
type do not result in fundamental unfairness, the court observed that 
Kleinman has no constitutional right to jury nullification, in contrast to 
indigent defendants who have a right to an attorney, and all defendants 
who have a right to be convicted only upon a finding of guilt beyond a 
                                                     
301. Numerous courts have emphasized that a defendant is not entitled to any such luck. See id. at 
695. 
302. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Dougherty, 
473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Ba elon, J., di en ing) ( The er  e ence of he j r  
function is its role as spokesman for the community conscience in determining whether or not blame 
can be impo ed. ).  
303. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a  2051 ( [T]he j r  ha  epara e and distinct institutional interests. 
Among he e are he main enance of he j r  r c ral role in go ernmen  and i  f nc ion a  he 
voice of the community. Injuries to these institutional interests remain, regardless of whether the 
individual criminal defendan  i  deemed o ha e been prej diced. ). 
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rea onable do b . 304 The overall tenor of the opinion was that the error 
implicated such a dubious power that it simply could not be important 
enough to warrant automatic reversal.305 
B  foc ing on he ab ence of a defendan  righ  o n llifica ion 
overlooks the fact that the Sixth Amendment nonetheless guarantees a 
decision by an independent jury. When a jury instruction is so coercive 
that it deprives the jury of the right to freely decide whether to acquit, then 
the defendant cannot be said to have received trial by an independent 
jury and can barely be said to have received a trial by jury at all. The 
difficulty inheres in trying to distinguish instructions that properly inform 
juries that they should follow the law from those that are impermissibly 
coercive. When an instruction does in fact cross the line into coercion, 
ho e er, i  nece aril  in r de  on he j r  ole phere of a hori . And 
the harm that results from that intrusion implicates one of our most 
fundamental protections against tyrannical government. 
I  i  al o or h remembering ha  r c ral error  i  no  non mo  
i h mo  egregio  error.  In ead, r c ral error  def  harmle ne  
review for one of the reasons articulated in Weaver.306 But calling 
something structural error does not mean the right at issue is the most 
critical or that its denial always results in a miscarriage of justice.307 For 
example, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,308 the Supreme Court had 
li le ro ble  concl ding ha  he erroneo  depri a ion of co n el of 
choice qualified as structural error.309 It did not matter whether the counsel 
defendant did receive conducted the trial admirably.310 Nor did it matter 
that the right itself was subject to exceptions, inapplicable to indigent 
defendan , and empered b  he rial co r  ide di cre ion in balancing 
fairness and efficiency concerns.311 Once the right was violated, the 
critical point was that the effect of the error was impossible to measure
that was all that was required for the error to qualify as structural.312 
This objection regarding the dubious status of nullification is therefore 
aimed less at challenging the idea that coercive instructions amount to 
                                                     
304. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2017).  
305. Id. at 1033 35.  
306. Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017). 
307. Id. ( An error can co n  a  r c ral e en if he error doe  no  lead o f ndamen al nfairne  
in e er  ca e. ). 
308. 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
309. Id. at 150.  
310. Id. at 150 51. 
311. Id. at 151 52.  
312. Id. at 150.  
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structural error than it is at challenging the idea that such instructions 
amount to constitutional error at all. Certainly, there is room for 
disagreement about which instructions are coercive enough to qualify as 
error.313 A  ome poin , ho gh, in r c ion  ha  in r de on a j r  po er 
to acquit against the evidence must cross the constitutional line. Were that 
not so, there might be a decent argument that the Constitution does not 
actually prohibit directed guilty verdicts (or, at least, that such errors 
might be harmless).314 Yet no one, I suspect, believes that a court should 
be able to direct a guilty verdict or punish jurors for returning an acquittal, 
or that an appellate court should affirm the resulting verdict. 
Assuming that truly coercive anti-nullification instructions do amount 
to constitutional error, the question reduces to whether such errors are 
amenable to harmless error analysis. The difficulties inherent in 
attempting to apply a harmlessness rubric in this context suggest to me 
that the error is a structural one. Moreover, it is troubling that this error 
could have a constitutional dimension but by operation of a 
harmle ne  anal i  ha  foc e  on he reng h of he pro ec ion  
case and presumes that jurors mechanically apply the law uniformly 
lack a remedy as a practical matter. 
Some might also question why automatic reversal is appropriate when 
no one doubts that the defendant is guilty. The answer, in short, is that the 
reversal of the conviction serves purposes other than those related to the 
particular defendant. Indeed, it is precisely because the violation at issue 
i  o nrela ed o he defendan  in ere  in a oiding erroneo  con ic ion 
that automatic reversal is particularly appropriate here. Like the public-
trial right, the right at issue here primarily serves interests unrelated to 
erroneous conviction, but the defendant is the one who can vindicate 
that right.315 
Requiring automatic reversal under these circumstances would likely 
discourage trial courts from suggesting to jurors that they lacked powers 
they in fact possess. It could also help to ensure that juries decide cases 
freel , no  nder hrea  of p ni hmen  if he  reach he rong  re l . 
And it would vindicate the basic structural safeguards in Article III and 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution, emphasizing the jury 
                                                     
313. Compare United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2017), with United States 
v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988). See also discussion supra section I.B.2. 
314. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) ( The Si h Amendmen  req ire  more 
than appella e pec la ion abo  a h po he ical j r  ac ion, or el e direc ed erdic  for he S a e 
would be sustainable on appeal . . . . ); Neder . Uni ed S a e , 527 U.S. 1, 33 34 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
315. See Shepard, supra note 152, at 1207 08 (explaining that the public-trial right serves the 
di inc  al e of ran parenc  and ha  li le or no hing o do i h [ he rial ] reliabili  or i  
f ndamen al fairne ); Waller . Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984). 
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rial righ  role in en ring ha  he go ernmen  canno  crea e and enforce 
criminal law without feedback from local communities. 
B. Public Policy Objections 
In addition to the analytical objections discussed above, some may see 
problematic pragmatic consequences to deeming coercive anti-
nullification instructions automatically reversible error. I anticipate two 
primary objections of this sort, which represent different sides of the 
same coin. 
First, some may fear that classifying coercive anti-nullification 
instructions as structural error will increase incidents of nullification and 
decrease perceptions of fairness and public confidence in the criminal 
justice system. In cases in which a coercive anti-nullification instruction 
seems necessary albeit constitutionally problematic it is likely that the 
government has presented overwhelming evidence of guilt. Requiring 
automatic reversal in those cases might appear particularly unfair, given 
that those defendants are perhaps among the most clearly guilty of the 
crimes with which they have been charged. 
Moreover, requiring automatic reversal for improper nullification 
instructions might discourage trial courts from providing juries with even 
gentle admonitions to follow the law. Wishing to avoid automatic 
reversal, courts may be even more hush-hush about the subject, confusing 
juries and perhaps increasing the incidence of nullification. To the extent 
ha  n llifica ion i  ie ed a  anarchic, ing rial co r  hand  in 
discouraging that practice may leave some unsettled. While nullification 
can serve merciful and just purposes, it can also exacerbate and perpetuate 
prejudices. And frequent nullification might actually impede reformation 
of unjust laws by mitigating their effects, thus preventing popular outrage 
that might be best expressed at the ballot box. Most problematically, some 
may worry that increased nullification might undermine the rule of law. 
Second, and on the flip side, classifying coercive anti-nullification 
instructions as structural error might counterintuitively decrease the 
likelihood that appellate courts will find such instructions to be erroneous 
at all. Because appellate courts will know that this type of error 
automatically results in reversal, they may be less likely to deem 
instructions that approach the line to be erroneous, thereby shifting the 
line itself to allow a greater range of anti-nullification instructions. To the 
extent that one believes that juries should be insulated from instructions 
that misstate their power or threaten them with punishment based on the 
verdict they return, there is an argument to be made that classifying this 
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type of error as structural would actually impede that goal.316 
Both of these objections are interesting but somewhat beyond the scope 
of this Article. Moreover, given that true nullification distinguished 
from cases involving ambiguous facts appears to be rare, classifying 
coercive anti-nullification instructional errors as structural likely would 
not affect the outcome in a large number of cases. It would, however, 
serve important institutional purposes. Classifying these errors as 
structural comports with Supreme Court case law and prevents appellate 
courts from engaging in a harmlessness analysis that makes little sense 
and fails to serve the purpose of the underlying right. In doing so, it 
pro ec  he in egri  of he em and indica e  he j r  f ndamen al 
power to speak for the community. 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent that federal and state laws increasingly diverge or that 
punishments for certain crimes outpace community sensibilities, 
questions surrounding jury nullification and what can be said about it
may become more salient.317 When a court instructs the jury that it lacks 
the power to acquit or may be punished for doing so, the court eviscerates 
some of the essential purposes of trial by jury. Because that error defies 
analysis for harmlessness, it should result in automatic reversal. 
 
  
                                                     
316. We should hesitate to tolerate constitutional error out of a concern that correcting the error 
might lead courts to adjust their analyses to reach the same practical outcome. That approach 
disregards the importance of the constitutional issues and assumes that courts will engage in results-
oriented politicking.  
317. See Barkow, supra note 220, at 1017 (explaining that the nature of constitutional checks and 
balances, incl ding he j r  rial righ  and he j r  po er o acq i , pro ide  ample e idence ha  
the potential growth and abuse of federal criminal power was anticipated by the Framers and that they 
intended to place limits on it through the separation of po er ). 
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